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Abstract 
This master thesis examines different aspects of projected synergies made by the management 
of acquiring firms. We study how synergies are estimated, how they affect bid premiums, and 
if disclosing acquirers are likely to avoid overpayment. From SDC, we retrieve information 
on the size of projected synergies and relevant financial data on acquirers and targets. We 
apply this data in three different OLS regressions.  
We hypothesise that targets with high expense levels are more likely to create cost synergies 
for acquirers. When testing the hypothesis, our regression suggests that the expense levels of 
targets seem to increase the projected synergies. Furthermore, our second hypothesis claims 
that the size of the projected synergies has a positive relationship with bid premiums. Our 
findings support the suggested hypothesis. However, disclosing acquirers seem to, on average, 
pay a lower premium than non-disclosing acquirers. This might be due to inherent differences 
in deal characteristics between disclosing deals and non-disclosing deals. Our last hypothesis 
is that the market believes that disclosing acquirers are less likely to overpay for the target. 
We find that acquirer CAR seems to increase with premiums paid by disclosing acquirers. One 
possible explanation for this is that the market believes that disclosing acquirers are more 
likely to avoid overpayment. However, there might exist other explanations since disclosing 
acquirers seem to pay lower premiums, and the reason for this is not clear.  
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1. Introduction 
One of the main reasons for a firm to undergo a merger or acquisition process is to achieve 
gains from combining with the target. These gains are often referred to as synergies, and the 
source varies between transactions. Scholars have tried to understand whether synergies affect 
the deal structure and market reactions. However, estimating synergies is no easy task as it 
requires extensive research and is subject to uncertainty. Therefore, the existence of synergies 
is often assumed or captured by imprecise estimates. 
Even though synergies are difficult to estimate, some acquirers disclose their projections of 
synergies at the date of the announcement in merger filings or company press releases. The 
validity and credibility of these are uncertain. However, these projections might be the best 
estimations of the synergies we will eventually observe. As management sits with inside 
information, it might be more likely to create accurate projections compared to outsiders. This 
claim is supported by Hassel and Jennings (1986), who find that management estimates are 
often more accurate than estimates made by analysts. 
If an acquirer believes that a deal can create synergies, the value creation can justify paying a 
premium over market value for the target. Nevertheless, a prominent theory in M&A is the 
hubris hypothesis put forward by Roll (1986). He claims that premiums paid in deals are most 
likely miscalculations by the acquirer. These miscalculations are then acted upon due to CEO 
overconfidence. The acquirer does, therefore, overpay for their target as it pays for value 
creation that will never happen. However, in deals with disclosed synergies, the estimates are 
public, and the link between premium and value creation should be clear. If not, the acquirer 
is communicating overpayment, and the market will react accordingly.   
In this paper, we will examine on which basis synergy projections are quantified, how they 
affect the price the acquirer is willing to pay for a target, and how the market reacts to the 
premium paid by disclosing acquirers. Our thesis thereby follows the journey synergies take 
from estimation to initial public perception. Hence, we define three hypotheses examining the 
role disclosure of synergies has in M&A.  
Our first hypothesis is that there exists a positive relationship between target expense level 
and the size of projected synergies. The hypothesis is tested with an OLS regression. Our 
suggestion is supported by Gorbenko and Malenko (2014) and Levine (2017), who argues that 
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acquirers find high operational expense levels attractive as they give cost-cutting opportunities 
as well as possibilities for economies of scale. Furthermore, Bena and Li (2014) claim that 
R&D expenses are also attractive as they facilitate growth and opportunities for innovation 
which could increase value creation. Interestingly, we show that target expense levels have a 
positive relationship with projected synergies. 
Our second hypothesis is that the size of the projected synergies is positively correlated with 
the size of premiums. We test the hypothesis by conducting an OLS regression, where we find 
that there is a positive relationship. This is in line with the theory proposed by Slusky and 
Caves (1991), who claim that synergistic gains are one of the major sources for increasing the 
acquirer’s willingness to pay higher premiums.  
Our third hypothesis proposes that the market believes that acquirers who disclose synergies 
are less likely to overpay for their target. With OLS regression, we test the relationship 
between acquirer Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) and the premium in deals with 
disclosure of synergies. A positive relationship could suggest that the market believes that the 
acquirer does not overpay as overpayment leads to negative returns. Our hypothesis is based 
on the work by Dutordoir, Roosenboom, and Vasconcelos (2014), who find that the market 
reacts positively to synergy disclosure and thereby consider these projections credible. Hence, 
the market might be more likely to believe that disclosing acquirers avoid overpayment. Our 
results suggest a positive relationship between acquirer CAR and the premium paid by 
disclosing acquirers, which is significant at the 1% level.  
We have structured the thesis into eleven sections, where the first one is an introduction. 
Section 2 contains our key literature, which is applied to create our three hypotheses outlined 
in section 3. Further, section 4 reviews literature that helps identify control variables. Section 
5 explains the data and the process of gathering and finalising it, and section 6 defines our 
dependent, independent, and control variables. Section 7 formulates our methodology, which 
then leads into section 8, where we examine descriptive statistics for our samples. Section 9 
contains the analysis of our results, and section 10 describes the robustness of our models. 
Lastly, section 11 presents our conclusion.  
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2. Key literature  
In this section, we review key literature for defining our hypotheses. The goal is to clearly 
outline the literature we apply when finding our research questions. First, we look into 
synergies and drivers of value creation. Then we review the literature concerning voluntary 
disclosure of synergies by management before examining the role of synergies when 
determining bid premiums. Lastly, we examine remarks extant studies make about market 
reactions regarding bid premiums.  
2.1 Types of synergies  
One of the main reasons for a firm to undertake an M&A is the potential efficiency gains from 
the merger. Management often forecasts these gains as merger-related synergies that enable 
the acquirer to pay a price over market value for the target. It is difficult to prove the existence 
of these synergies or calculate them in advance. The difficulty is related to uncertainty in 
predicting how the stand-alone company would have performed without the merger and the 
future performance of the merged entity. Even though managers provide their best estimates 
of the expected synergies, there may still be problems with realisation.  
According to Schweiger and Very (2003), there are four basic sources of synergies: market 
power, cost, revenue, and intangibles. Cost synergies are the easiest to capture in an M&A and 
also the easiest to document ex-post. We can further divide cost synergies into fixed cost 
reduction and variable cost reductions. The fixed cost reduction might be the result of 
economies of scope and scale, and variable cost reductions could be increased purchase power 
and improved productivity. Synergies originating from increased market power, revenue, and 
intangibles are more difficult to capture and also harder to predict. Typical revenue synergies 
come from cross-selling products through complementary distribution channels to new 
customers and geographical regions. Synergies from market power come from increasing 
market share through increased entity size and by removing a competitor. Intangible synergies 
are the most difficult to predict and quantify; these synergies come from brand name 
extensions, sharing of knowledge and experience.  
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2.2 Sources of cost synergies 
As Schweiger and Very (2003) find cost synergies to be the easiest synergies to estimate, 
investigating whether target expense levels affect synergies is of interest. Bena and Li (2014) 
find that targets with higher R&D expenses are more attractive to acquirers and especially 
strategic acquirers. As higher levels of R&D spending could increase the potential synergies 
for strategic acquirers, they show an increased premium paid. The argument is that the target’s 
R&D spending can be used to develop products that enhance the strategic acquirer’s operations 
or increase post-merger innovation, which facilitate value creation. Gorbenko and Malenko 
(2014) and Levine (2017) find that targets with high operating expenses are also attractive to 
acquirers. The explanation is that acquirers seek poorly performing targets, as the potential for 
cost synergies are higher. Levine (2017) argues that the growth of acquirers has stagnated; 
they, therefore, want targets that will increase economies of scale and boost growth. 
2.3 Voluntary synergy disclosure 
In some deals, management will voluntarily disclose their projections of synergies. Generally, 
management might have an incentive to disclose inside information. This is particularly 
pertinent in cases where there is severe asymmetrical information between insiders and 
outsiders, CEO compensation is affected by stock price, or prior to public equity offerings.1 
In each case, the main objective of the disclosure is to reduce negative stock returns. 
Dutordoir, Roosenboom, and Vasconcelos (2014) support the argument above and suspect that 
management voluntarily discloses synergies to reduce negative stock returns. They further 
find that disclosure of synergies increases abnormal returns. Although the decision of 
disclosure seems opportunistic, they argue that the quality of these estimates is high, which is 
in line with Hassel and Jennings (1986). To further support the claim that synergy estimates 
are of high quality, Dutordoir, Roosenboom, and Vasconcelos (2014) argue that management 
is more likely to refrain from disclosing in cases with uncertainty, as disclosing increases 
litigation risk. According to Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, misleading 
 
1 See Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2007), Myers and Majluf (1984), and Nagar, Nanda and Wysocki (2003). 
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synergy disclosure is unlawful. Disclosing synergies thereby increases the risk of litigation 
and would be an unnecessary risk if management is uncertain in its estimates. 
2.4 Premiums and synergistic gains 
When deciding how much the acquirer should pay for the target, the acquirer must define its 
reservation price. The rational belief is that the acquirer’s reservation price should not exceed 
the potential synergies plus the target market value. The price acquirers pay over market value 
is referred to as bid premium, and the difficulty in predicting the potential synergies makes it 
hard for the acquirer to know exactly how large this premium should be.  
Sirower  (1999) claims that the premiums paid will reflect the expectations of synergies. He 
argues that the acquirer will reveal its expectancy of synergies when announcing the premium. 
Higher premiums will thus mean higher synergy expectance. Slusky and Caves (1991) further 
claim that the premium paid lies somewhere between the acquirer’s reservation price and the 
market value of the target. They argue that as synergistic gains increase, so will the willingness 
of the acquirer to pay for the merger or acquisition. The authors define the achievement of 
economies of scope and scale as important drivers of synergies. They thereby use firm 
relatedness as a proxy for synergies, since related firms are more likely to achieve economies 
of scope and scale.  Their proxy fails to find any effect these gains might have on premiums.   
Newer research on the relationship between premiums and synergistic gain uses the synergy 
projections of acquirer management. Ismail (2011) attempts to find out whether management 
projected synergies affect merger premiums. By using a data sample from 1985 to 2003, he 
does not find that projected synergies increase with the merger premium.  He further claims 
that though this finding is surprising, it needs further empirical investigation before it warrants 
acceptance.  
2.5 Overpayment and market reaction  
The size of the acquirer return is often influenced by the market’s view of the announced 
premium. If the market believes that the acquirer is overpaying for the target, the market reacts 
negatively. Overpayment occurs when acquirers pay a premium that is not justified by 
potential value creation. 
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Roll (1986) explains overpayment by introducing the Hubris hypothesis. The hypothesis paints 
a picture where the market value of a target is correct, and there are no takeover gains. In this 
world, the takeover premium is an error made by the bidding firm as it has overvalued the 
target, and any transaction would, therefore, not create value.  Roll argues that a transaction 
will only be made because of CEO hubris, as the CEO convinces himself that the market is 
wrong and that his valuation is correct. Roll furthermore claims that even if takeover gains 
exist, we would still see errors and that, on average, not every single transaction can create 
value because of these errors. If the market does not believe that the transaction will create 
value, the acquirer will see its stock drop in value. Therefore, if the CEO wishes to obtain 
bidder gains, the strategic rationale and the benefits of the deal have to be communicated with 
credibility and accuracy. 
Moreover, Sirower and Mueller (2003) find that the market reacts negatively as the premium 
increases since the likelihood of overpayment increases. The premium also has further 
implications for the performance of the combined firms. According to Sirower (1999), as many 
as 70% of acquirers will not be able to deliver results in line with the paid premium. Datta, 
Pinches, and Narayanan (1992) support this. They show that firms struggle to compensate for 
the paid price by earning adequate returns. Further, a too high premium might be a burden for 
the firm and puts pressure on management to engage in the restructuring processes and sell off 
assets (Wayne, Young, & Morris, 1997).  
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3. Hypotheses 
In this section, we explain how we derive our three hypotheses from the key literature in the 
section above. Our hypotheses concern how synergies are projected, how they are applied in 
estimating premiums, and how these premiums are received by the market. Below we present 
the different hypotheses separately. 
3.1 Management projections of merger-related synergies 
Hypothesis 1: Projected synergies increase with the target expense level. 
What managers base their synergy estimates on is not always clear, though, as Schweiger and 
Vary (2003) point out, the easiest synergies to estimate are cost synergies. Nonetheless, 
whether projections build on related theories is uncertain, but as extant studies show, managers 
wish to avoid ambiguity in their estimates and do not disclose when uncertainty is high. On 
this base, we wish to examine whether projected synergies are closely related to cost synergies, 
as these usually can be estimated with more certainty. The sources of cost synergies are often 
linked with the cost structure of the targets. Extant studies claim that as target expense levels 
increases, the potential for synergies is higher. Our first hypothesis derives from these studies, 
where we examine whether management bases its synergy projections on target expense 
levels.  As existing research only discuss potential synergy drivers, we contribute by 
examining if management follow the mentioned theory when projecting synergies. We hence 
add to the existing research as none of the previous research examines how target expense 
levels might affect management synergy projections. 
Our hypothesis mainly concentrates on the target’s operational and R&D expenses, as 
reviewed literature frame these as attractive for strategic acquirers. We note that extant studies 
claim that R&D expenses facilitate both cost synergies and revenue synergies. Therefore, we 
do not exclude the possibility that R&D expenses capture synergy effects other than cost 
synergies.  
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3.2 Merger premium 
Hypothesis 2: Premiums increase with the size of projected synergies. 
The management projection of synergies represents the value the acquirer believes the deal 
will create, and the projections might further determine the acquirer’s reservation price. Thus, 
an increment in synergistic gain from the deal will cause a corresponding increment in the 
acquirer’s reservation price. The management projections of synergies should hence be 
reflected in the price the acquirer is willing to pay for the target. This claim is in line with 
Sirower (1999), who argues that the size of the premium reveals the expected synergies. 
Extant studies agree with this claim but fail to find a significant relationship between projected 
synergies and premium. However, the data samples applied in these findings are prior to 2003, 
and the nature of synergy disclosure might, therefore, have changed. We re-examine their 
findings by applying a newer data sample.  
3.3 Premiums in disclosed deals 
Hypothesis 3: Acquirer CAR increases with premiums in deals with synergy disclosure. 
Extant studies find that a major factor for the reduction in bidder gains is overpayment. The 
market seems to react negatively to a higher premium as the likelihood of overpayment 
increases. However, extant studies have not investigated how the market reacts to premiums 
paid by acquirers that disclose synergies. Our hypothesis examines whether the market 
believes that these acquirers are less likely to overpay. Dutordoir, Roosenboom, and 
Vasconcelos (2014) show that the market reacts positively to disclosed synergy estimates, 
which suggests that the market finds these estimates credible. Therefore, it could be interesting 
to investigate if the market is more inclined to believe that the acquirers that disclose avoid 
overpayment.  
We examine the relationship premiums in deals with synergy dislosure have with acquirer 
CAR. The application of CAR, rather than other measures, is based on the findings that it 
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provides the best estimate of the stock market’s valuation of the merger.2 A positive 
relationship might suggest that disclosing acquirers avoid overpayment in the market’s view. 
We apply a 3-day event window for acquirer CAR as it allows for better isolation of 
announcement effects since it reduces noise from unrelated market movement.  
 
2 See Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2005) and Harford (2005), who find that other methods are biased or rely heavily on 
assumptions.  
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4. Relevant literature 
In this section, we examine extant studies that are related to the M&A process. Our goal is to 
define drivers of synergy, premium, and acquirer CAR, other than those suggested in our 
hypotheses. This helps us build precise models with efficient control variables.  Furthermore, 
the section will be structured section-wise as the deals seem to be affected by effects in three 
different categories. The three categories discussed below are Conditions in the market, Target 
characteristics, and Deal characteristics. Note, as for target characteristics, some of the 
relevant literature used to find efficient control variables is already discussed in section  2.  
4.1 Conditions in the market 
4.1.1 Merger waves 
The activity in the merger market has, over the years, occurred in a wave-like pattern. It is 
well known that these waves exist, but there is no consensus concerning what drives them. 
The waves often reach different industries at different times. Research from Mitchell and 
Mulherin (1996) ties the waves within different industries to technology, economic, and 
regulatory shocks in particular industries. Other studies, such as Eisfeldt and Rampini (2003), 
consider waves a result of capital liquidity in the market. They show that capital liquidity is 
cyclical and impacts the degree of total capital reallocation in the market. Furthermore, 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2005) find a correlation between fundamental stock 
valuation in the market and merger waves. Lastly, Gugler, Mueller, Weichselbaumer, and 
Yurtoglu (2012) find that there is a negative correlation between merger waves and market 
reactions. The authors claim that acquirers are more likely to see a negative market return if 
they undergo an M&A process during a merger wave.   
4.2 Target characteristics 
4.2.1 Other sources of acquisition gains 
Alongside synergistic gains, defined in section 2.1, there exists other sources of value creation 
in M&A. Servaes (1991) and Slusky and Caves (1991) claim that the merger might create 
value if the target’s management is performing poorly. These gains are called managerial 
11 
 
gains. Servaes (1991) show that acquirers that take over poorly performing targets are more 
likely to achieve higher abnormal returns. With regard to abnormal returns, he finds that the 
importance of target performance is greater than how the acquirer performs. Slusky and Caves 
(1991) examine the performance of targets in relation to bid premiums. Their findings suggest 
that if stock return captures management performance, good performance will increase target 
returns, which again lead to lower premiums.  
4.2.2 Size difference 
Extant literature shows that the relative size of the target and acquirer has implications for both 
premium and stock performance. However, extant studies find that these implications vary 
based on the relative size of the target. Kitching (1967) finds that deals where the target is 
relatively small create less value for the acquirer. Therefore, acquirers should seek out targets 
that are similar in size. He argues that similarity in size is more likely to create value. However, 
Alexandridis, Fuller, Terhaar, and Travlos (2013) conclude that acquirers tend to pay less for 
large firms. As to bidder gains, several studies show that deals with relatively large targets 
tend to achieve higher abnormal returns for the acquirer.3   
4.3 Deal characteristics 
4.3.1 Firm relatedness 
Several studies claim that relatedness can cause value creation. Lemelin (1982) finds that 
relatedness in industry affiliation is likely to increase the potential synergies. He argues that 
firms look to create growth by both vertical and horizontal acquisition. Shelton (1988) 
proposes that acquirers create more value by buying targets with similar assets. She further 
claims that acquirers should look for related targets that either expand the existing business or 
enable expansion into related markets. Mercer (1999) argues that acquiring related firms 
creates value as it increases the simplicity of removing duplicated activities and cross-selling 
products to new and existing customers.  
 
3 See Eckbo and Thorburn (2000), Jarrel and Poulsen (1989), and Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2007). 
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4.3.2 Payment method  
In an M&A decision, the acquirer faces many different choices, where one of the more 
important decisions is the selection of payment methods. An acquirer has the choice between 
cash, stocks, or a mixture of the two.  
Martin (1996) concludes that an acquirer will prefer to pay with internal cash if they have the 
available cash reserves. As a firm often has limited cash reserves, it also must consider taking 
up debt if it wishes to pay all cash. Myers and Majluf (1984) further find that full payment in 
stocks will convey information to the market that the acquirer is financially constrained. 
Martin (1996) and Myers and Majluf (1984) claim that the financial structure of the deal is of 
substantial importance for both firms, and several empirical studies have further shown how 
it influences the premium and the announcement return. La Brusleire (2013) highlights that 
the choice of payment is not a continuum between an all-cash and an all-stock offer. He shows 
a positive relationship between the percentage of cash in the offer and the merger premium. 
Eckbo (2008) also supports these findings and finds that the premium tends to be higher when 
the offer is an all-cash offer.  
Further, Eckbo (2008) finds substantial evidence for a negative market reaction on average 
when the acquirer offers seasoned equity. The argument behind this finding is that outside 
investors could believe that the seasoned equity offered is overpriced. Travlos (1987) supports 
these claims as he find that all-stock payments give the lowest and sometimes negative returns 
for the acquirer Lastly, when it comes to announcement return, Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) 
and Giammarino, Heinkel, and Eckbo (1990) find that all-cash offers give, on average, the 
highest abnormal announcement return.  
4.3.3 Effects of competition in M&A 
The M&A market will, in many cases, be competitive, with multiple participants competing 
for a single target. A bidding war in M&A can force the winning bidder to pay a price over 
the intended premium. Eckbo and Betton (1999) find that in cases with a bidding war, the first 
bid is, on average, lower than in deals where there is only one single bid. This could imply 
that the first bidder in a bidding war expects competition for the target and might, therefore, 
be afraid of giving too high an opening bid. Nevertheless, they show that the first bidder in a 
bidding war only has a 41% chance of winning the target. This might imply that there is no 
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first-mover advantage. The study further shows that the second bidder raises the initial bid by 
as much as 10%. 
While the initial bid is, on average, lower in multiple-bidder cases, empirical evidence shows 
the opposite when it comes to the winning bid. With a sample of over 10 000 U.S. targets from 
1973-2002, Eckbo, Thorburn, and Betton (2009) show that the final bid premium in cases with 
multiple-bidders is, on average, eight percentage points higher than in deals with one single 
bidder.   
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5. Data and sample selection 
To further be able to build our models and test our hypothesis, we collect relevant data. When 
gathering our data, we use different databases and methods to end up with our final samples. 
A thorough process is important to ensure quality in our data sample and that it contains 
enough information for testing our hypotheses. We will use this section to present how we 
gather our data and create our final samples.  
5.1 SDC Platinum 
To retrieve data on deals, we use SDC platinum, which has information on over 1.1 million 
global transactions since the 1970s (Refinitiv, 2012). It allows the user to sort on deal 
characteristics, so only the deals that fit one’s criteria are retrieved. The number of possible 
criteria is large, and these criteria range from target and bidder nationality to exact deal value. 
Furthermore, SDC allows the user to retrieve the matching deals in a custom report. This report 
can include announcement dates and deal value, but also target and bidder financials as well 
as the deal attitude or if any poison pills existed. To retrieve a manageable and concise data 
sample, it is therefore important to be certain of what information is necessary.  
5.1.1 SDC criterion 
Our data sample ranges from 01.01.2009 to 31.12.2018, which is ten years, and only contains 
US deals, which means that the acquirer and the target are both US firms. The target and 
acquirer can be public or private and from any industry. As to the deal itself, the status must 
be completed and unconditional, which makes our results only apply to deals with the same 
status. The value of the transaction must be disclosed, and we are interested in Mergers and 
Acquisitions when we sort on the form of the deal. Preliminary attempts have revealed that 
information on expected synergies is scarce. We keep these criteria as uncomplicated as 
possible so as not to put large constraints on our data sample. Entering these criteria gives us 
a data sample of 3 367 transactions. When retrieving the transactions in our custom report, we 
include items such as deal value and premium, but also target and bidder financials. 
Management projections of synergies are also included in this report, which SDC has retrieved 
from merger filings or press releases. If SDC is not able to find a specific item searched for in 
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the custom report, the cell that would contain this information is left blank rather than 
excluding the entire transaction from the sample.  
5.2 Additional criterion 
5.2.1 Further sample screening 
The custom report from SDC is exported to Excel, where we sort it further. The screening 
makes sure we have the required financial information to create the variables defined in section 
6. In cases where R&D cost is left blank, we assume that the specific company does not have 
any or capitalises the expenses, and it is, therefore, equal to zero. Many of the deals do not 
include a bid premium or are lacking essential financials for either bidder, target, or both. 
These deals are excluded, which reduces the sample substantially. We end up with a data 
sample of 775 observations. The transactions in this sample are all equal when it comes to 
information available; the only differences are whether expected synergies are disclosed or 
not. In our final data sample, only 210 transactions have disclosed expected synergies, which 
leaves 565 transactions where expected synergies are not disclosed. See section 13.1 for table 
with sample creation. We do not want to remove outliers, as this could potentially harm the 
statistical validity of our model since the final sample is relatively small.  
5.2.2 Synergy  
When retrieving synergy estimates from SDC, these are given as annual values before tax. 
However, we wish to use the present value of these synergies. The present value of synergies 
is calculated as in Dutordoir, Roosenboom, and Vasconcelos (2014), and Houston, James, and 
Ryngart (2001). We first retrieve one-year acquirer Beta from WRDS, to find the cost of equity 
using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). The following equation is applied: 
𝑘𝑒 = 𝑅𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑃 
where Rf is the risk-free rate given by the US 10-year treasury bond at the time of the 
announcement, βi is the Beta of acquirer 𝑖, and RMP is the market premium set to 7%4.  The 
cost of equity is further applied when estimating the present value of synergies. This assumes 
 
4 See Dutordoir, Roosenboom and Vasconcelos (2014), Houston, James and Ryngart (2001) and Ismail (2011). 
  
 
16  
no debt financing but does, however, give conservative estimates of synergies.5 Cost of equity 
is further applied when estimating the present value of synergies, which is given by the 
following equation: 
𝑃𝑉 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑒𝑠 =
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑒𝑠
(𝑘𝑒 − 𝑔)
 
We thereby assume that the annual synergies are achieved immediately after consummation, 
which means that combined companies do not need a few years before synergies are realised, 
which sometimes is the case. Furthermore, we assume the growth to be 2%, which is equal to 
inflation. The present value of synergies is before tax estimates, as the annual synergies listed 
in SDC are before tax. 
5.2.3 Premium criterion 
We also retrieve one-day premiums from SDC. However, SDC has been proven to be 
somewhat unreliable, as shown in a study done by Mulherin and Simsir (2015). They find that 
24.1% of the premiums given by SDC are misleading as merger rumours have increased the 
share price of targets. Hence, we suspect that low or high premiums might be not correct. To 
solve this issue, we double check the merger filings of deals where the premium is lower than 
5% or above 80%. In cases where SDC is wrong, we adjust the premiums to the one-day 
premiums listed in merger filings found in the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and 
Retrieval (EDGAR) database by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).  
5.3 Eventus 
To test the third hypothesis, we retrieve data samples containing CAR for the bidders around 
the announcement dates. For this, we use Eventus, which is a program made by Wharton 
Research Data Services (WRDS) that lets one enter a file with the acquirer’s Committee on 
Uniform Securities Identification Procedures (CUSIP) code and respective announcement 
date. To find the acquirers’ CUSIP, we use a linking table from WRDS where we match the 
acquirers’ tickers from the data sample we created earlier. For our Benchmark, we use the 
 
5 See Dutordoir, Roosenboom and Vasconcelos (2014),  Houston, James and Ryngart (2001) and Ismail (2011). 
17 
 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Equally Weighted Market Index, which is an 
equally weighted portfolio that contains all securities listed on NYSE, NYSE American, 
NASDAQ and ARCA (CRSP, 2019). Our estimation period ends 46 days prior to the event 
date, and the estimation length is 255 days. These are all default parameters in Eventus; in 
most cases, it will also ensure that the event itself or merger rumours do not affect the market 
model. Eventus estimates the normal return for this period, which it further uses to calculate 
abnormal returns and thereby cumulative abnormal returns for our event window. The normal 
return is estimated by the single-factor market model given by the following formula: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where Ri,t is the return of firm 𝑖 on day t, βi is the beta of firm 𝑖, and Rm,t is the return of the 
market index on day 𝑡. Ri,t is then used as the expected return when estimating abnormal return. 
Daily abnormal returns for a specific firm are estimated by the following formula: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡) 
where Ri,t is firm 𝑖’s observed return on time 𝑡 and E(Ri,t) is firm i’s expected return on time t 
as shown in the previous equation. CAR is estimated by summing the calculated Abnormal 
Returns found in our event window. It is given by the following formula:  
𝐶𝐴𝑅(𝑡1,𝑡2) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
 
where t1 and t2 is the first and last day in the event window.  The retrieval of CAR reduces our 
data sample somewhat as the CUSIP is not found for every acquirer, or Eventus does not 
manage to estimate abnormal returns for every acquirer. The sample is thus reduced from 775 
to 610 transactions, where 153 have disclosed synergies. We retrieve CAR with event 
windows from -1 to +1, which is the event window applied when testing or third hypothesis. 
The three day event windows is also commonly used in similar studies. 6  
 
6See Alexandridis, Fuller, Terhaar, and Travlos (2013), Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004, 2007), and Díaz, Sanfilippo, 
and Lopéz (2009). 
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6. Variables  
With the data gathered, we further form our models by defining different variables used to test 
our hypothesis. Each of our three hypotheses will be tested with an individual regression, with 
dependent and explanatory variables in line with the discussion in section 2. Furthermore, the 
corresponding control variables in each regression have been shown to affect our dependent 
variables in extant studies discussed in section 4. 
Firstly, in this section, we will introduce the variables used as dependent and explanatory 
variables for each regression. We then present relevant control variables .7 
6.1 Key variables 
6.1.1 Regression 1  
Projected synergies 
The variable projected synergies are retrieved from the SDC database, where it is listed as the 
management’s projections of synergies. The projected synergies retrieved are given as annual 
synergies, and we further calculated the PV as described in section 5.2.2. To normalise the 
synergies, we divide the PV of expected synergies by target market value four weeks prior to 
the announcement, which is in line with the method Ismail (2011) applies. The projected 
synergies variable is used as the dependent variable in our first regression as research 
frequently claims that management projections of synergies are a reliable quantification of 
synergies.8  
Operating expenses 
As SDC does not report operating expenses for targets, we make this variable by subtracting 
EBITDA from net sales. To find a ratio that is comparable and consistent across all firms, we 
divide operating expenses by total assets. The variable is used as an explanatory variable in 
our first regression, as Gorbenko and Malenko (2014) and Levine (2017) claim that targets 
 
7 See section 13.1 for a full table with all variable definitions and the data source used to retrieve each variable.  
8 See Dutordoir, Roosenboom, and Vasconcelos (2014), and Hassel and Jennings (1986). 
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with high operational expenses are suitable for cost-cutting, and hence a potential source of 
synergistic gain.  
R&D expenses 
We create the R&D expenses variable by dividing the target’s R&D expenses retrieved from 
the SDC database on total assets. Some of the targets do not report R&D expenses, and here 
we assume that the firm does not have any or that it capitalises the expenses. Using the variable 
R&D expenses as an explanatory variable for projected synergies is supported by Bena and Li 
(2014). As mentioned, they find that higher R&D expenses facilitate both cost synergies and 
revenue synergies.  
 
6.1.2  Regression 2 
Premium 
The premium for each transaction is retrieved from SDC. It is given in percentages paid over 
target market value one day prior to the announcement. It is used as the dependent variable in 
regression 2.  
Projected synergies 
Projected synergies is the dependent variable in regression 1, and further becomes an 
explanatory variable in regression 2, where we want to test whether synergies explain the 
premium paid. Extant studies claim that synergies increase the acquirer’s willingness of paying 
for the target, and using management projections is further found to be a more reliable 
estimation compared to analyst estimations of synergies (Hassel & Jennings, 1986). 
 
6.1.3 Regression 3 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) 
CAR is retrieved from Eventus and, as shown in section 5.3, it is estimated by summing the 
calculated abnormal returns in the event window for a specific firm. Since we wish to test how 
the premiums announced in disclosing deals affect the stock return of the acquirer, we retrieve 
acquirer CAR observed on the announcement date of the respective deals. The event windows 
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we wish to look at are -1 to +1. As discussed in section 3.3, a short event window isolates the 
effect of the announcement and reduces noise from unrelated market movement. 
Interaction variable – Synergy disclosure and premium 
This variable is created by multiplying the dummy variable synergy disclosure with premium 
and allows testing of hypothesis 3 with OLS regression. By creating an interaction variable, 
we isolate the relationship premiums in deals with synergy disclosure have with acquirer CAR. 
This will enable an interpretation of how the market reacts to premiums in deals with disclosed 
synergies.  
 
6.2 Control variables 
6.2.1 Controlling for target characteristics 
To control for target-specific effects affecting synergies, premium, and CAR, we include 
different variables to capture these. Target characteristics such as Operating- and R&D 
expenses are used as the explanatory variables in our first regression. The variables are 
discussed in key literature but are used as control variables in the second and third regression, 
while the P/B - difference and relative size are present in all our regressions as control 
variables.  
Operating and R&D expenses  
As control variables, operating expenses and R&D expenses are calculated as described in 
section 6.1. As Levine (2017) and Bena and Li (2014) find that the size of both expense levels 
could affect acquisition gain, we control for operating expenses and R&D expenses in the 
second and third regressions.  
Price to book difference (P/B - difference) 
P/B - difference is a continuous variable where the P/B of the target is subtracted from the P/B 
of the industry. Target P/B is collected from the SDC Database, while Industry P/B is retrieved 
from Thomson Reuters Datastream. The inclusion of this variable is based on extant studies 
that claim that stock performance signals management performance, discussed in section 
4.2.1. A low target P/B is more likely to suggest that the target has low growth prospects 
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compared to the industry. Therefore, it might be a sign of a struggling firm incapable of 
growing with high pressure on its margins. This could signal the potential for managerial 
gains. It is further included in all three regressions. 
Relative size 
Relative size is a continuous variable, defined as the total assets of the acquirer are divided by 
the total assets of the target. The decision to include relative size as a control variable is based 
on the extant literature that shows how it affects value creation, premium, and acquirer 
abnormal return.9 Therefore, relative size will be controlled for in all our regressions.  
 
6.2.2 Controlling for deal characteristics 
In section 4.3, extant literature claims that deal characteristics have an impact on our 
dependent variables. As not all deal characteristics have been shown to affect value creation, 
we choose to only include the variable Same macro industry in our first regression. 
Furthermore, we include all control variables controlling for deal characteristics in the second 
and third regressions.  
Same macro industry 
This is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the acquirer and target operate in the same 
macro-industry. The variable is made by comparing the macro industries, defined by SDC, for 
the acquirer and target. Extant studies find that firm relatedness in M&A increases the 
possibility of value creation as the firms can expand the business.10 It is included in all our 
regression to capture effects related to different types of synergies. 
All cash and all stocks 
As the payment method can be all cash, all stocks, or a mixed payment, we include two 
dummies for the two first options. All cash is a dummy that is equal to one if the payment 
method is only cash and zero; otherwise,  All stocks is a dummy for an all-stock offer. If the 
 
9 See Eckbo and Thorburn (2000), Jarrel and Poulsen (1989), Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004), and Kitching (1967). 
10 See Mercer (1999), Lemelin (1982) and Shelton (1988). 
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deal is a mixed offer, both dummies will take the value of zero. As extant studies show that 
payment method in most cases influences both the premium paid and CAR, we believe that 
these variables are efficient control variables in the second and third regressions.  
Multiple Bidders 
This variable is a dummy for bidding war. It takes the value of one if more than one bidder 
put in an offer for the target. If the variable is zero, it tells us that there was only one bidder in 
the auction and that this bidder also acquired the target. As Eckbo and Betton (1999) and 
Eckbo, Thorburn, and Betton (2009) show, the number of bidders affects the premium. Thus, 
we consider this to be an important control variable for regression 2 in particular, but it will 
also control for the effect of a bidding war in regression 3.  
Premium 
Premium as a control variable is retrieved as mentioned in section 6.1.2 and is included in 
regression 3. Sirower and Mueller (2003) find that as premium increases, acquirer CAR is 
reduced, which is in line with the overpayment hypothesis. The authors claim that the 
likelihood of overpayment increases with premium size, which makes the market react 
negatively. Besides being a control variable in regression 3, premium is also used as part of 
the explanatory interaction variable discussed in section 6.1.3.   
Synergy disclosure  
As not all our deals disclose synergies, we use a dummy for synergy disclosure as a control 
variable in the second and third regressions. Synergy disclosure is used as a way to isolate the 
effect that projected synergies have on the premium in regression 2. Furthermore, it is used in 
regression 3 to interact with premium to form an interaction variable discussed in section 6.1.3. 
 
6.2.3 Controlling for conditions in the market 
To control for the market conditions discussed in section 4.1, we have chosen to include two 
different variables. We have chosen to include variables controlling for year and industry fixed 
effects as similar studies have argued for the use of fixed effects in their models. This is 
supported  by literature on merger waves.   
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Year dummies 
These variables are dummies used to control the yearly variation in merger activity. 
Controlling for years are highly supported in similar studies and will be included in all our 
regressions. The literature on merger waves further supports controlling for year fixed effects, 
as merger activity varies across time and will affect all our dependent variables. We avoid 
overfitting in our model by pairing years together, which gives us five dummies, 2009/2010, 
2011/2012, 2013/2014, 2015/2016, and 2017/2018. The 2017/2018 dummy is our benchmark 
in all regressions where year fixed effects are included.  
Industry dummies 
To cover any industry-specific effects, we include dummies for the four largest industries in 
our sample, Healthcare, High Technology, Financials, and Energy & Power. These control 
variables are included in all our regressions, as Mitchell & Mulherin (1996) find that merger 
waves hit different industries at different times through shocks and industry-specific events. 
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7. Methodology 
In the following section, we introduce and describe the empirical analysis used in this thesis 
to test the presented hypotheses. First, we explain how we apply a statistical univariate test (t-
test) to examine differences in subsamples. Secondly, we outline the design of our three 
regressions and which assumptions that must hold.  
7.1 Two sample t-test 
In our sample, we have both deals with and without management projections of the synergies. 
The part of the sample that does not have management projection of synergies could 
potentially have synergy projections which are, however, not made available to the public. It 
is, therefore, interesting to compare the different variables between the two groups. Note, this 
test is not conducted to look for any causal relationships, but to compare means- and median 
values across the two subsamples. We will not include all variables in this test, but test for the 
difference between the most important variables in our regressions as well as deal value. The 
t-test will be summed up and visualised in a table in section 8.2. As the sample shrinks when 
retrieving acquirer CAR, we conduct a separate t-test for this sample.  
7.2 OLS regression 
Since our dependent variables are continuous, we can use OLS regressions to explore the 
dependent variables’ relationship with their respective explanatory variables. Common for all 
our models is that the variables are observed in different time periods and different industries. 
We might, therefore, see year or industry fixed effects of economic conditions in the M&A 
market. However, including too many dummies might make the model overfitted. This could 
cause regression coefficients, p-values, and R-squared to be misleading (Wooldridge, 2016). 
To avoid this, we pair years into dummies and only include industry dummies for industries 
that consist of a substantial amount of our total observations. Constructing our models in this 
way thereby serves two purposes, avoiding overfitting and increasing robustness as this helps 
to adjust for clustered standard errors. We also use robust standard errors when there are issues 
with heteroscedasticity (see section 10.4 and appendix 13.5.2).  
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The second and third models differ from the first as there are reasons to believe that there 
exists endogeneity in the form of omitted variable bias (Heckman, 1979). The bias would 
occur as reasons or motivations behind the decision to disclose synergies are not known and 
hence are difficult to control. For instance, management’s decision on disclosure could be 
motivated by the expectation of unfavourable market reactions when the deal is announced. 
However, the specific reason why management chooses to disclose is not available to the 
public. Heckman (1979) provides a method to control for unobserved variables by using a 
probit regression and the inverse Mills ratio, which is a two-step treatment effects regression 
model. The first step is the probit regression, where we use target and deal characteristics as 
explanatory variables, while the dummy variable synergy disclosure is the dependent variable. 
The estimation of the probability that disclosed synergies are equal to one is used to calculate 
the inverse Mills ratio. By including the ratio in the original OLS regressions, we control for 
endogeneity, which is the second step. If there is endogeneity, the ratio will be significant.  
The results of the test are discussed in section 10, and the probit regression is listed in the 
appendix, section 13.3. 
 
7.2.1 Regression 1: OLS with synergies 
Hypothesis 1 – Synergies 
𝑆𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽2𝑅&𝐷_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒_𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽4 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 
+ 𝛽5 𝑃/𝐵_𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝜀𝑖 
The first model’s main objective is to examine the relationship between the projected synergies 
and target expense levels. We add relevant target and acquirer characteristics used as control 
variables in similar empirical models. We perform the regression step by step in Table 9-1, so 
we can examine the effect on our depending variable by adding or removing different control 
variables. 
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7.2.2 Regression 2: OLS with premium  
Hypothesis 2 – Premium 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑_𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑_𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 + 𝛽3𝑃/𝐵_𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒
+ 𝛽4 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒_𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝛽5𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽6𝐴𝑙𝑙_𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝛽7𝐴𝑙𝑙_𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘
+ 𝛽8𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒_𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 + 𝛽9𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽10𝑅&𝐷_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠
+ 𝛽11𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑛𝑜_𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽12𝑅&𝐷_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑛𝑜_𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖 
In the second model, we test hypothesis 2 by examining the relationship between premium 
and projected synergies. We include the control variables as listed in regression 1 but also add 
variables controlling for deal characteristics. The regression is performed step by step and is 
shown in Table 9-2.  
7.2.3 Regression 3: OLS with CAR 
Hypothesis 3 – CAR 
𝐶𝐴𝑅(−1, +1)𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑑_𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 + 𝛽4 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒_𝑚𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦
+ 𝛽5𝐴𝑙𝑙_𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝛽6𝐴𝑙𝑙_𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 𝛽7𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑒_𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 + 𝛽8𝑃/𝐵_𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽9𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒
+ 𝛽10𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽11𝑅&𝐷_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖 
In the third model, we test hypothesis 3, which examines the relationship between bidder gain 
and premiums in disclosing deals. We add the same control variables as the second model. 
The regression is performed step by step and shown in Table 9-3. 
The assumptions for the third model are somewhat different from the other two as we must 
assume that the benchmark chosen is the most fitting and that there are ideal market conditions. 
We have tested the available benchmarks supplied by Eventus and find that the chosen 
benchmark provides the best results. As for ideal market conditions, we assume that the trading 
of the firm’s stock is frequent and that no information leakage took place prior to the 
announcement date. Finally, market reaction is subject to the market’s opinion on the 
likelihood of deal completion. We assume that the market’s opinion of likelihood is 
uncorrelated with the left-hand side variable.  
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8. Descriptive statistics and two-sample t-test 
To give an overview of our sample, we present descriptive statistics. We divide the sample 
into two subsamples: deals with disclosed synergies and deals without disclosed synergies. 
We will go through and present our sample from a few different angles before conducting two 
independent t-tests for the difference in means between the subsamples. The first t-test will, 
as mentioned in section 7.1, be for the whole sample by comparing the most important 
variables, and the last test will be done with the CAR-sample to compare the different CAR 
between our two subsamples.  
8.1 Deal and variable overview 
8.1.1 The total sample 
We start by presenting the sample of deals across different years. Table 8-1 shows that out of 
our total sample of 775 deals, the earlier years contain fewer deals than the later years. The 
year with the fewest deals is 2011, while the year with the highest number of deals is 2015.  
 
 
Table 8-1 also displays the percentage of deals in the total sample that disclose synergies in 
each year. As shown in the table, 27.1 % of the deals in the total sample disclose their 
synergies. The year where fewest deals disclosed their synergies was 2013, while the most 
were in 2016. Overall, the distribution of disclosure is somewhat evenly spread across the 
years.  
Table 8-1  Deals over the years - Total sample 
Years Number of deals
% of total sample 
disclosing synergies
2009 56 33.93 %
2010 77 22.08 %
2011 51 29.41 %
2012 65 26.15 %
2013 72 15.28 %
2014 91 25.27 %
2015 103 28.16 %
2016 94 34.04 %
2017 75 29.33 %
2018 91 27.47 %
Total/Average 775 27.10 %
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We next present the target market value of the two subsamples, where the market value is the 
trading price of the target four weeks before the announcement of the deal. Table 8-2 shows 
that targets in our sample have market values from under USD 100 million to USD 65 billion. 
 
The table shows that most of the smaller targets in our sample are acquired by acquirers that 
do not disclose their synergies. Further, acquirers that disclose synergies more often acquire 
targets thar are large. It thus seems that in deals with larger targets, the acquirers are more 
willing to disclose their projections of synergies voluntarily. Perhaps voluntary disclosure is 
necessary to make investors accept the larger deals. 
 
 
 
 
Target Market Value                                    
(in million USD)
Disclosed synergies
Disclosed synergies                 
% of total
No Disclosed synergies
No Disclosed synergies                   
% of total
Total number of 
deals
0 to 100 8 4.68 % 163 95.32 % 171
100 to 200 14 15.38 % 77 84.62 % 91
200 to 400 16 15.53 % 87 84.47 % 103
400 to 600 14 25.45 % 41 74.55 % 55
600 to 800 13 33.33 % 26 66.67 % 39
800 to 1000 13 40.63 % 19 59.38 % 32
1 000 to 2 000 43 41.75 % 60 58.25 % 103
2 000 to 3 000 20 41.67 % 28 58.33 % 48
3 000 to 5 000 27 52.94 % 24 47.06 % 51
5 000 to  10000 20 48.78 % 21 51.22 % 41
10 000 to 15 000 4 23.53 % 13 76.47 % 17
15 000 to 25 000 8 72.73 % 3 27.27 % 11
25 000 to 40 000 4 66.67 % 2 33.33 % 6
50 000 to 65 000 6 85.71 % 1 14.29 % 7
Total 210 27.10 % 565 72.90 % 775
Table 8-2 Overview of Target market value - Total sample 
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8.1.2 Overview of premium paid 
To get a close overview of premium paid by the two subsamples, we have created Table 8-3. 
The table shows that our sample consists of deals where the acquirer pays from -20 % to 360 
% over market value for the target. However, most of our deals have premiums ranging from 
10 % to 75 % over market value.  For both subsamples, it looks as if the distribution is evenly 
spread across the premiums. We will discuss the difference in means for the premium paid 
across the two subsamples in section 0. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8-3 Overview of premium paid – Total sample 
Premium over market 
value in % 
Disclosed Synergies
Disclosed synergies as             
% of total 
No Disclosed synergies
No Disclosed synergies as 
% of total
Total number of deals
- 20 % to 0 % 6 30.00 % 14 70.00 % 20
0 % to 10 % 31 31.96 % 66 68.04 % 97
10% to 20 % 39 29.32 % 94 70.68 % 133
20 % to 30 % 48 33.80 % 94 66.20 % 142
30 % to 40 % 34 25.37 % 100 74.63 % 134
40 % to 50 % 14 18.42 % 62 81.58 % 76
50 % to 75 % 23 21.70 % 83 78.30 % 106
75 % to 100 % 7 18.92 % 30 81.08 % 37
100 % to 150 % 6 27.27 % 16 72.73 % 22
150 % to 360 % 2 25.00 % 6 75.00 % 8
Total 210 27.10 % 565 72.90 % 775
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8.1.3 Overview of disclosed synergies 
In this subsection, we present descriptive statistics for the subsample consisting of the 210 
deals that disclose synergies.  Firstly, we take a closer look at the dollar value of the expected 
synergies. Synergies are presented as Present value (PV) of before tax synergies, and as Table 
8-4 shows, our sample has deals that project up to USD 65 billion in PV synergies.11 
Nevertheless, the projected synergies are mostly below USD 2.5 billion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 See section 5.2.2 for calculation of (PV) of synergies 
PV(Synergies)                     
in million USD
Number of deals % of total
0 to  250 25 12 %
250  to  500 37 18 %
500  to  750 23 11 %
 750  to  1 000 16 8 %
1 000  to  2 500 55 26 %
2 500  to  5 000 26 12 %
5 000  to  10 000 16 8 %
10 000 to 20  000 5 2 %
20 000  to  40 000 5 2 %
40 000  to  65 000 2 1 %
Total 210 100 %
Table 8-4 PV of expected synergies - Disclosed synergy sample 
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8.2 T-test for difference in means across subsamples - 
Whole sample 
Table 8-5 displays the means and medians for the most important variables in our sample. The 
table further provides a t-stat for the difference in means across the subsamples. In this section, 
we go through the results from the t-test step by step.  
 
 
8.2.1 Premium 
The average premium paid for the total sample is 36%. Further, the table shows that the 
difference in means between the subsamples is not significant.  
8.2.2 Deal characteristics  
As to the payment method, when testing for differences in means, all cash is the only variable 
that is significantly different between the subsamples. The means are significantly different at 
the 10% level. It thus seems that deals where synergies are not disclosed pay in all cash more 
often. This, however, could be explained by the difference in relative size we observe between 
Table 8-5 T-test fort the diff. in means across subsamples Disclosed 
synergies and No Disclosed synergies 
 
                      All transactions                         Disclosed  Synergies                          No Disclosed synergies  T- Test for difference in mean
                     N= 775                      N = 210                 N=565
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median   Diff in mean   T-stat
Dependent variable
Premium 0.36 0.29 0.33 0.26 0.37 0.32 -0.04 -1.41
Deal characteristics
All cash offer 0.39 0 0.33 0 0.41 0 -0.08 -1.96 *
All stock offer 0.22 0 0.25 0 0.21 0 0.04 1.18
Mixed payment 0.39 0 0.42 0 0.38 0 0.03 0.88
Same macro industry 0.83 1 0.77 1 0.85 1 -0.09 -2.63 ***
Multiple bidders 0.04 0 0.05 0 0.03 0 0.01 0.84
Target Market Value                  
(in million USD)
2392 482 4937 1562 1446 269 3491 4.92 ***
Target characteristics
Price/Book difference 0.40 0.75 0.16 0.00 0.48 0.91 -0.32 -0.67
Operating expenses 0.66 0.50 0.83 0.65 0.60 0.39 0.23 3.79 ***
R&D expenses 0.05 0 0.04 0 0.05 0 -0.01 -1.93 *
Relative size 23.74 4.73 7.72 2.33 29.70 6.47 -21.98 -5.89 ***
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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the subsamples. Acquirers that disclose synergies are more similar to their target in size, which 
makes it more difficult to pay in all cash. 
Further, testing for the difference in the macro industry reveals a significant difference 
between the subsamples at the 1% level. Acquirer and target seem to operate in the same 
industry more often in deals where synergies are not disclosed. Hence, acquirers might be 
more likely to disclose synergy estimates when the target is in a different industry. As extant 
studies show, related firms are more likely to create value by combining. Perhaps the acquirers 
disclose in order to signal that though the target operates in a different industry, synergies still 
exist.  
As to multiple bidders, our sample mainly consists of deals with one bidder. Of the total 
sample, only 4% of deals experience a bidding competition. The difference between the 
subsamples is not significantly different on multiple bidders.  
The average target market value in the sample with disclosed synergies is USD 4 937 million, 
while the average is USD 1 446 million for the sample without disclosed synergies. 
Consequently, the difference in means is strongly significant at 1% level. This suggests that 
deals of larger value are more likely to disclose their synergies. Investors could potentially 
need more convincing when a deal is large; disclosing might hence nudge investors towards 
accepting the deal.  
8.2.3 Target characteristics 
For the P/B - difference across the two subsamples, there is no significant difference in means.  
There is, however, a significant difference in means between the expense levels. The operating 
expenses are significantly different at the 1% level, where targets in deals with disclosed 
synergies have higher operating expenses. The R&D expenses are also significantly different 
at the 10% level. Targets in deals without disclosed synergies tend to have higher R&D 
expenses. In appendix, Table 13-4, a large proportion of the non-disclosing deals take place 
in industries where R&D is important. This might explain the difference in means. Note that 
most targets do not have R&D expenses or capitalise these expenses, which explains the low 
means.  
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Table 8-5 shows that the means of the variable relative size are significantly different at the 
1% level between the two subsamples. The acquirer has, on average, 7.72 times larger total 
assets than the target in deals with disclosed synergies, while the same number is 29.7 times 
in deals without disclosure of synergies. This suggests that acquirer and targets tend to be 
similar in size in deals with disclosed synergies, while the acquirer tends to be relatively large 
in deals without disclosed synergies. Kitching (1967) claims that deals with similarity in size 
are more likely to create value. However, relatively large targets might also increase the 
complexity of synergy realisation. This could cause the acquirer of a relatively large target to 
disclose synergies. The goal is to communicate the benefits of the merger, and that 
management is able to realise the synergies successfully. Moreover, the difference in relative 
size might explain why deals with synergy disclosure are less likely to be all-cash transactions.  
Furthermore, note that the medians in the two groups are much more similar, which suggests 
large outliers.   
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8.3 T-test for the difference in means across subsamples – 
CAR Sample 
The sample used in the third regression is a smaller sample than the one used in the second 
regression. As discussed in section 5.3 above, this is due to Eventus’ inability to retrieve 
information on every deal. We have a total of 610 deals in this sample, where 157 deals 
disclose their synergies and 453 do not. In this section, we report results for three different 
event windows.  
 
Table 8-6 shows that the mean CAR for all event windows is slightly negative, although not 
significantly different from zero. There is also no significant difference in CAR between the 
two subsamples.  
 
Table 8-6 T-test for diff. in means across subsamples  
Disclosed synergies and No Disclosed synergies 
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9. Results 
In this section, we present the results from testing our three hypotheses. Since we use OLS 
regression, this section examines the coefficients of the variables and their significance before 
further discussing these in light of our reviewed literature. Each subsection includes a 
presentation of the results and a discussion.12 
9.1 Testing hypothesis 1 
9.1.1 Examining the results 
When we examine the relationship between the projected synergies and target characteristics, 
we test the following null hypotheses: 
H0: Projected synergies do not increase with target expense levels 
H1: Projected synergies increase with target expense levels 
The results of the OLS regressions are shown in Table 9-1, which presents five different 
regressions. Alongside the key explanatory variables discussed in section 6.1.1, columns 2 to 
5 include other target characteristics. We include year fixed effects in all columns except 
column 4 and 5. Furthermore, industry fixed effects are included in all columns, except column 
5. To clarify our null hypothesis, if either or both operational expenses and R&D expenses 
have a significant and positive effect on projected synergies, the null hypothesis is rejected. 
Column 1 shows that projected synergies has a positive relationship with both operating 
expenses and R&D expenses. Operating expenses is significant at the 1% level, while R&D 
expenses are significant at the 5% level.  
In column 2, we add the dummy same macro industry, which takes the value of 1 if target and 
acquirer operate in the same macro industry. The variable is added to capture effects of firm 
relatedness, which has previously shown to increase value creation. The inclusion of same 
 
12 For better visualization all regressions in this section are precented without year- and industry variables, see section 13.6 
for regressions with all variables visualized. 
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macro industry changes the significance level of R&D expenses to 10% while operating 
expenses remains unchanged.  
In column 3, we add variables concerning differences in size and management performance; 
relative size and P/B - difference. Relative size is included as extant studies find that relatively 
larger targets increase the potential of value creation. P/B - difference is added to capture 
effects of managerial gain, which the acquirer might achieve. The addition of these variables 
causes R&D expenses to gain significance, and it is now significant at the 5% level. Operating 
expenses is still significant at the 1% level. 
In column 4, we remove yearly fixed effects. This is done to see whether the variables vary 
across time, as it is not clear whether synergy estimates are affected by time fixed effects. 
When removing year fixed effects, R&D expenses reduces its significance level to 10% while 
operating expenses is still significant at the 1% level. 
In column 5, we remove both yearly and industry fixed effects. The industry fixed effect is 
removed for the same reason as yearly fixed effects. Removing both these effects does not 
alter the significance of operating expenses or R&D expenses. However, we note that the 
coefficient of R&D expenses drops in value when excluding industry fixed effects.  
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Table 9-1 Hypothesis 1: Regression with Projected synergies as dependent 
variable  
 Projected synergies 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Operating expenses 0.786*** 0.810*** 0.903*** 0.910*** 0.824*** 
 (0.177) (0.176) (0.189) (0.190) (0.188) 
 
R&D expenses 3.963** 3.478* 3.652** 3.331* 2.604* 
 (1.799) (1.799) (1.787) (1.801) (1.554) 
 
Same macro industry  0.637** 0.609** 0.580* 0.644** 
  (0.306) (0.305) (0.307) (0.306) 
 
Relative size   -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 
   (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
 
P/B – Difference   0.044* 0.045* 0.042* 
   (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
 
Constant 0.443* -0.057 -0.078 0.089 0.023 
 (0.246) (0.342) (0.341) (0.333) (0.313) 
 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes No No 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Observations 210 210 210 210 210 
Adjusted R2 0.126 0.140 0.153 0.130 0.113 
Standard errors in parenthesis                                                                       *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
9.1.2 Discussion  
In all model specifications, the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1% level: projected synergies 
seem to increase with the target’s expense levels. This inference is robust for adding control 
variables. Our findings are consistent with extant studies, suggesting that higher expense levels 
lead to higher synergies. Moreover, what type of synergies the management estimate is not 
clear. In section 3.1, we hypothesised that management would be more likely to disclose cost 
synergies as these are easier to estimate. Since high target expense levels seem to increase 
projected synergies, management seems likely to disclose cost synergies. However, whether 
or not the projected synergies are exclusively cost synergies is not clear. R&D expenses can 
facilitate both cost synergies and revenue synergies. Distinguishing which category R&D 
expense falls into is dependent on management intentions. Furthermore, the significance of 
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same macro industry does not help clarify which type of synergies the management disclose. 
Acquiring a related firm could be used to enter new markets, which increases revenue, or to 
achieve economies of scale, which reduces costs. Which type of synergy the management the 
expects to achieve from acquiring a related firm is not clear, potentially it could be both. 
Further, P/B-difference is significant at the 10% level, which suggests that the potential for 
managerial gain has a positive relationship with projected synergies. Takin all the mentioned 
factors into consideration, it  seems that the disclosed synorgies cannot be assumed to be cost 
synergies only.  
Moreover, we notice that the exclusion of year and industry fixed effects does not alter the 
rejection of the null hypothesis. This suggests that the projection of synergies does not vary 
across time or industries. It is not clear why synergies should vary across years. Moreover, it 
seems unlikely that there is no variation across industries, which the regression suggests. 
Industries where R&D matters are more likely to assume that R&D expenses lead to higher 
revenues or growth, while other industries would see R&D expenses as a way to cut costs. 
Thereby, how the projected synergies are influenced by R&D ecpenses could potentially vary 
across indsutries. However, we note that the drop in the coefficient of R&D expenses might 
suggest that some variation across industries exists. 
9.2 Testing hypothesis 2 
9.2.1 Examining the results 
When we examine the relationship between premium and projected synergies, we test the 
following null hypothesis: 
H0: Premiums do not increase with the size of projected synergies 
H2: Premiums increase with the size of projected synergies 
The results of the OLS regressions are shown in Table 9-2. All model specifications include 
year and industry fixed effects. The inclusion is based on literature from section 4.1, where it 
is claimed that merger waves affect the valuation of targets, which hit industries at different 
points in time. First, we examine the key explanatory variable in column 1, before including 
target and deal characteristics in columns 2 to 5. 
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Column 1 includes projected synergies and disclosed synergy only. Disclosed synergy is added 
to isolate the effect projections of synergy size have on the premium paid. Both variables 
generate coefficient estimates that are significant at the 1% level. However, projected 
synergies has a positive coefficient while disclosed synergy is negative. 
Column 2 includes the variable P/B – difference as well as relative size and same macro 
industry. P/B – difference is included as extant studies show that the performance of target 
management affects merger gains and premiums. The similarity in relative size often 
diminishes the acquirer’s possibility of paying a high premium, while same macro industry 
increases the potential for value creation, which should increase the acquirer’s willingness to 
pay for the target. Adding these variables does not change the significance of projected 
synergies or disclosed synergy.  
Column 3 further adds dummies for payment method, all cash, and all stocks, as well as the 
dummy multiple bidders. Extant studies show that the choice of payment and the presence of 
multiple bidders capture effects related to premium. Firstly, we see that all earlier included 
variables keep their significance level except disclosed synergy, which now is significant at 
the 5% level.  
In column 4, we include the two expense variables, operating, and R&D. Extant studies show 
that target expense levels are related to value creation and therefore impact the willingness of 
the acquirer to pay for the target. The inclusion of these variables makes disclosed synergy 
lose some of its significance, down to 10%. Furthermore, the absolute value of the coefficients 
for both disclosed synergy and projected synergies is reduced. One reason for the loss of 
significance and drop in coefficient might be that, as shown in regression 1, both R&D- and 
operating expenses seem to affect synergies. This can cause a problem with multicollinearity, 
where the expense variables take some of the effects away from the synergy variables.  
To mitigate the problems in column 4, we include two interaction variables in column 5. These 
interaction variables are interactions between each of the individual expenses and the deals 
without synergy disclosure. By including these variables, we isolate the effect that target 
expense levels might have on premiums in deals with no synergy disclosure. When including 
the interaction variables, we see from the table that disclosed synergy regains the significance 
at the 5% level. The significance of projected synergies is unaltered. 
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Table 9-2  Hypothesis 2: Regression with premium as dependent variable 
 Premium 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Projected synergies 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
 
Disclosed synergy -0.100*** -0.085*** -0.072** -0.051* -0.075** 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.032) 
 
P/B – Difference  0.004*** 0.004** 0.006*** 0.007*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
 
Same macro industry  -0.037 -0.033 -0.030 -0.029 
  (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) 
 
Relative size  0.001* 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
 
All cash   0.062* 0.057* 0.061* 
   (0.033) (0.031) (0.032) 
 
All stocks   -0.053** -0.054** -0.050* 
   (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
 
Multiple bidders   0.165 0.153* 0.150* 
   (0.110) (0.088) (0.086) 
 
Operating expenses    0.045* 0.095* 
    (0.026) (0.050) 
 
R&D expenses    0.565 -0.026 
    (0.386) (0.250) 
 
Interaction - R&D and  
No Disclosed synergy 
    0.741
* 
(0.422) 
 
 
Interaction - Operating and  
No Disclosed Synergy 
    -0.073 
(0.053) 
 
 
Constant 0.347*** 0.357*** 0.326*** 0.271*** 0.277*** 
 (0.024) (0.041) (0.045) (0.054) (0.049) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 775 775 775 775 775 
Adjusted R2 0.050 0.061 0.080 0.108 0.116 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis                                                                    *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01        
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9.2.2 Discussion 
Overall, the results in Table 9-2 reject the null hypothesis at the 1% level in all columns. The 
model thus suggests that there is a positive relationship between projected synergy sizes and 
premiums. By re-examining the effects that projected synergies might have on premiums, we 
oppose the findings of Ismail (2011) and Slusky and Caves (1991). Nevertheless, our findings 
are in line with the theory presented, which argues that synergistic gain increases the acquirer’s 
willingness to pay a higher premium.  
Further, the coefficients of significant control variables for both target and deal characteristics 
are as expected. However, the variable synergy disclosure is negative and with varying 
significance in all model specifications. This suggests that although premium seems to 
increase with the size of projected synergies, premiums are, on average, lower in deals where 
synergies are disclosed.  
The negative coefficient of synergy disclosure is conflicting with the t-test conducted in Table 
8-5, where we see no difference in premium means between the subsamples. It seems, 
therefore, that controlling for the size of projected synergies, and year and industry fixed 
effects, reveals a difference between the subsamples. Why we observe these differences could 
be explained by differences between the subsamples presented in section 8.2. It might be that 
targets or deal characteristics in deals with disclosure are inherently different.  
As shown in section 8.2, the means of the subsamples are significantly different in all cash, 
relative size, and same macro industry. Acquirers that do not disclose synergies seem to be 
more likely to pay all cash, to be relatively large, and are more likely to operate in the same 
industry as their target. These are all factors that could affect the premium paid. Extant studies 
show that all cash deals, on average, pay higher premiums. Furthermore, as the relative size 
difference between targets and disclosing acquirers is small, it can make it harder for these 
acquirers to pay large premiums. This is supported by Alexandridis et al. (2013), who finds 
that acquirers pay less for relatively large targets. Lastly, firm relatedness is shown to increase 
value creation, which could increase the acquirer's willingness to pay a high premium. These 
factors can help explain why we observe that disclosing acquirers pay lower premiums. We 
do not exclude the possibility of other factors that are not discussed or included here.  
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9.3 Testing hypothesis 3 
9.3.1 Examining the results 
When we examine the relationship between bidder gain and premiums paid in disclosing deals, 
we test the following hypothesis: 
H0: Acquirer CAR does not increase with premiums in deals with synergy disclosure  
H3: Acquirer CAR increases with premiums in deals with synergi disclosure 
We test Hypothesis 3 by running OLS regression presented in Table 9-3. As in the previous 
models, column 1 does not include control variables for target and deal characteristics. They 
are included in columns 2 to 4. Furthermore, we use CAR (-1, +1) as the dependent variable 
since short even windows better capture the imminent effects of the announcement. Year and 
industry fixed effects are controlled for in all columns as merger waves have shown to affect 
acquirer abnormal return. 
In column 1, we include disclosed synergy and premium alongside Interaction - Disclosed 
synergy and Premium (The interaction variable). The interaction variable has a positive 
coefficient and is significant at the 1% level. This suggests that there is an interaction 
relationship between premium and disclosed synergy. Premium has a negative coefficient and 
is also significant at the 1% level. The variable disclosed synergy is not significant.  
In column 2, we add control variables related to deal characteristics, which are shown to affect 
acquirer CAR. These variables are same macro industry, all cash, and all stocks. Same macro 
industry captures effects connected to firm relatedness, which extant studies find increase 
value creation and thereby should increase CAR. The payment method is shown by numerous 
studies to have important implications for market reaction and is therefore added. The 
inclusion of these variables does not change the significance of the interaction variable or 
premium. 
In column 3, we add the target characteristics variables, P/B – difference and relative size. P/B 
- difference captures effects related to the performance of target management, where acquiring 
poorly performing targets increases abnormal returns. Relative size is added as extant studies 
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find that acquiring relatively large targets lead to higher abnormal returns. The significance of 
the explanatory variable is not altered by adding these control variables.  
In column 4, we add target characteristics, which in this case is R&D expenses and operating 
expenses to capture effects related to target characteristics that might increase value creation. 
None of these change the significance of the interaction variable or premium. 
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Table 9-3 Hypothesis 3: Regression with CAR as dependent variable 
 CAR (-1,+1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Premium -0.037*** -0.045*** -0.047*** -0.048*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
 
Disclosed synergy -0.013 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
 
Interaction - Disclosed synergy  
and Premium 
0.050*** 
(0.017) 
0.054*** 
(0.015) 
0.053*** 
(0.015) 
0.052*** 
(0.016) 
 
Same macro industry  0.012 0.012 0.013* 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
 
All cash  0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
 
All stocks  0.004 0.004 0.004 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
 
Multiple bidders  0.029** 0.029** 0.030** 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
 
P/B - Difference   0.001** 0.001** 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
 
Relative size   0.00001 0.00000 
   (0.00003) (0.00003) 
 
Operating expenses    0.003 
    (0.005) 
 
R&D expenses    0.001 
    (0.034) 
 
Constant -0.004 -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.035*** 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 610 610 610 610 
Adjusted R2 0.067 0.118 0.129 0.127 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis                                                                    *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01        
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9.3.2 Discussion 
The results from our last OLS regression suggest that there is a positive relationship between 
the premiums in deals that disclose and the acquirer CAR. The interaction variable is 
significant at the 1% level, which thus rejects the null hypothesis for all model specifications. 
Note that the sum effect is positive, even though premium is negative. One interpretation of 
the finding is as hypothesised in section 3.3; the market believes that disclosing acquirers are 
more likely to avoid overpayment. Overpayment is shown to reduce abnormal returns; a 
positive reaction would hence suggest that disclosing acquirers keep some of the value creation 
from the deal and thereby avoid overpayment.  
However, whether the market believes that disclosing acquirers avoid overpayment because 
they disclose is not clear. As examined in section 9.2, disclosing acquirers seem to pay on 
average a lower premium than non-disclosing acquirers. In section 9.2.2, we discussed that 
certain deal characteristics could explain the lower premiums. These factors may help 
disclosing acquirers avoid overpayment. Since disclosing acquirers seem less likely to pay all-
cash, the implication is that premiums will be lower. Disclosing acquiers are also more likely 
to acquire relatively larger targets which is suggested to reduce premium. Alexandridis et al. 
(2013) support this as they find that acquirers of relatively large targets are more likely to 
avoid overpayment. Lastly, since disclosing acquirers seem to more often operate in different 
industries than their targets, the potential for value creation might be reduced. The reduction 
of value creation suggests that the acquirers are less willing to pay a high premium for the 
target. Given these factors, it is not possible to claim that the market believes that disclosing 
acquirers are more likely to avoid overpayment.  
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10. Robustness 
To test whether our models are robust, we will, in this section, discuss statistical caveats that 
our models may be exposed to and how we correct them. We will also examine whether our 
results are robust to altercations of our dependent variables. The results of any robustness test 
done in this section will be found in section 13, the appendix.  
10.1 Sample size 
The sample sizes collected and used vary between our different models, where the first model 
has the smallest sample with 210 observations. However, similar studies on synergies and 
synergy disclosure do not collect sample sizes that are substantially higher than ours. 
Furthermore, SDC might not be able to collect every deal that discloses synergies. Finding 
these deals would have taken us a considerable amount of time as merger filings and press 
releases for each deal would have to be examined thoroughly. Yet, we tread carefully when 
drawing inference from our results as the precision of our variables might be reduced.  
10.2 Causal relationship 
Claiming a causal relationship between dependent variables and explanatory variables must 
always be done with great caution. There might be factors we have not included or considered 
that further explain the results we have obtained. For example, there might be other target 
characteristics that explain how the acquirer estimates the projected synergies such as 
proximity in culture and increased brand recognition. Our regressions, suggest that the 
explanatory variables have significant effect on the dependent variables. However, we 
examine our results attentively to avoid wrongly claiming the existence of causality. 
10.3 Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity is created when two or more independent variables are highly correlated, and 
can lead to misleading results (Wooldridge, 2016). To check whether our models are exposed 
to multicollinearity, we use a VIF-test. The VIF-test estimates how much the variance of 
independent variables is increased due to a high correlation with other variables. For our 
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models, the tests suggest that there are not considerable problems with multicollinearity 
(appendix, section 13.5.1). Adding variables such as interactions, causes some 
multicollinearity according the VIF-test in regression 2. 
To examine the result of the VIF-test further, we create correlation matrices for each model, 
which show that the correlation is moderately low or low for most of our variables (Section 
13.5.1). We thereby interpret these coefficients carefully in accordance with Wooldridge 
(2016).  
10.4 Heteroscedasticity 
Heteroscedasticity can have a serious impact on the estimation of standard errors, which leads 
to unreliable confidence intervals and hypotheses testing (Wooldridge, 2016). It is created 
when the variance of the standard errors is not constant. To test for heteroscedasticity, we 
perform a Breusch-Pagan test where the null hypothesis is that the model is homoscedastic. 
The tests yield p-values close to zero for regressions 2 and 3, which means that the null is 
rejected and suggests that our regressions contain heteroscedasticity (appendix, section 
13.5.2). To handle this, we use robust standard errors in these regressions. 
10.5 Endogeneity 
Endogeneity occurs when an independent variable correlates with the error term. This 
correlation could be due to omitted variable bias where unobserved variables affect the 
dependent variable. In our case, we suspect that one such variable is management’s motivation 
for voluntary disclosure of synergies. The problem occurs because deals where synergies are 
disclosed may have different characteristics that drive the premium itself. If management 
wants to rationalise paying a high premium or suspects a negative market reaction to an 
announcement, disclosing information could potentially justify its decision. This reason is, 
however, unknown and is thus difficult to control.  
We perform a Heckman correction and find that we might have issues with endogeneity in 
regressions 2. Some of the independent variables lose their significance when adding the 
inverse Mills ratio, which controls for correlation with the error term. However, the inverse 
Mills ratio itself is not significant, and our null hypothesis is still rejected. This is why we have 
not included OLS regressions with the Heckman correction in our results section. The probit 
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regressions used for estimating the inverse Mills ratio and the OLS regressions containing the 
inverse Mills Ratio are listed in the appendix, section 13.3.2.  
In regression 3, we also suspect endogeneity and thereby add the inverse Mills ratio to a 
regression similar to column 5 in Table 9-3. The inverse Mills ratio in this model is negative 
and insignificant, which means that the Heckman correction does not find endogeneity in our 
model. Furthermore, adding the inverse Mills ratio does not alter the coefficients or 
significance of the other variables. The regression including the inverse Mills ratio is listed in 
the appendix, section 13.3.2. 
10.6 Testing model consistency 
Furthermore, to test our models for consistency, we conduct the three regressions similar to 
the regressions listed in section 9 but with other dependent variables. This is to test the 
robustness of our depending variables and the results of our regressions.  
Firstly, in regression 1, we scale the projected synergies to PV. However, as SDC gives these 
synergies as annual synergies, we conduct a regression to test whether the usage of annual 
synergies as a dependent variable give another result than in section 9.1. The new regression 
is listed in section 13.4.1, and as seen in Table 13-8, our explanatory variables are robust for 
annually projected synergies as the dependent variable.  
In the second regression, the dependent variable is premium. This variable is the premium the 
acquirer offers over the market value of the target one day before the announcement of the 
deal. When using premium one day prior to the announcement as the dependent variable, the 
market value of the target could suffer from fluctuation in price due to merger rumours. 
Therefore, we test whether our explanatory variables are sensitive to a premium calculated 
earlier than one day prior to the announcement. We, therefore, obtain the four weeks premium 
from the SDC database and conduct a new regression, see section 13.4.2. As we can see in 
Table 13-9, our results are robust to the new dependent variable.  
We further test the robustness of regression 3 with two different event windows as the 
dependent variable. Firstly, testing with CAR(-1,0) as the dependent variable, our explanatory 
variables lose some of their significance, see section 13.4.3. The explanatory variable in Table 
13-10 is not significant in columns 1 and 4 but is significant at the 10% level in columns 2 and 
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3. To further test the robustness of regression 3, we do another regression with CAR(-2,+2) as 
the dependent variable, see section 13.4.3. Table 13-11 shows the same results as in section 
9.3, where the explanatory variable is significant at the 1%  level in all columns. Summed up, 
the result is ambiguous as the explanatory variable is seen to be robust to the event window 
CAR(-2,+2), but loses some significance when using CAR(-1,0).  
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11. Conclusion 
In this thesis, we have studied the role of disclosing synergies in the M&A process. Firstly, 
we examined the characteristics affecting the size of the projected synergies before analysing 
the synergies’ role in premium paid. Lastly, we study whether the market believes that deals 
with synergy disclosure are more likely to avoid overpayment. Relevant empirical research 
has helped to form the three hypotheses: (1) Projected synergies increase with target expense 
levels, (2) Premiums increase with the size of projected synergies (3) Acquirer CAR increases 
with premiums in deals with synergy disclosure. Furthermore, to test our hypotheses, we have 
collected relevant data from SDC and conducted three different OLS regressions controlling 
for relevant factors reviewed in extant literature. All our regressions seem to be robust for 
nearly all model specifications. 
Our first model suggests that management projections of synergies increase with target 
expense levels, specifically operational and R&D expenses. Our findings are in line with 
extant studies, which suggest that targets with high expense levels facilitate higher synergies. 
However, whether management discloses cost synergies exclusively is less clear. As our 
results suggest,  other types of synergies seem to affect the management’s projected synergies. 
The second model suggests that the size of the projected synergies has a positive relationship 
with the size of bid premiums. However, our regression suggests that disclosing acquirers, on 
average, are more likely to pay a lower premium than non-disclosing acquirers. Further, we 
discuss whether inherent differences in deal and target characteristics could explain the lower 
premiums. Extant studies show that some deal or target characteristics are more likely to lead 
to lower premiums. We suspect that these characteristics could be more likely to occur in deals 
with synergy disclosure. 
In our last model, we examine whether the market believes that acquirers in deals with synergy 
disclosure are less likely to overpay for the target. We create an interaction variable by 
multiplying the dummy synergy disclosure with the variable premium. We use the acquirer 
CAR to measure whether the market believes that the acquirer is overpaying. The interaction 
variable seems to have a positive relationship with the acquirer CAR, and the sum effect is 
positive. This suggests that the market believes that acquirers that disclose synergies are less 
likely to overpay for their target. However, since disclosing acquirers seem to pay a lower 
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premium, we discuss whether this can explain the positive market reaction. Therefore, it is 
uncertain whether the market believes that disclosing acquirers avoid overpayment.  
Lastly, we believe that there are interesting findings to be made for further research. The 
management’s intention in synergy disclosure is not clear, and without inside information, one 
can only speculate. A qualitative paper based on interviews with disclosing managers could, 
therefore, be of interest. Further, what type of synergies the management estimate is not clear 
as we find that factors related to revenue synergies also seem to increase the projected 
synergies.  We thereby suggest that scholars continue examining how much of the projected 
synergies are based on cost synergies and how much is based on other sources. Further, more 
research can be made on why disclosing acquirers seem to pay lower premiums. Where the 
research could be made on the differences in the deal and target characteristics between deals 
with disclosed synergies and deals without disclosed synergies.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
52  
12. Bibliography 
Alexandridis, G., Fuller, K., Terhaar, L., & Travlos, N. (2013). Deal size, acquisition premia and 
shareholder gains. Journal of Corporate Finance, 1-13. 
Bena, J., & Li, K. (2014). Corporate Innovations and Merger and Acquisitions. USA: The Journal of 
Finance, Volume 69, Issue 5. 
CRSP. (2019). Stock File Indexes . Retrieved from Center for Research in Security Prices: 
http://www.crsp.com/products/documentation/stock-file-indexes 
Datta, D., Pinches, G. E., & Narayanan, V. K. (1992). Factors influencing wealth creation from 
mergers and acquisitions: A meta‐analysis. Kansas, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. . 
Díaz, B., Sanfilippo, S., & Lopéz, C. (2009). Are M&A Premiums Too High? Analysis of a Quadratic 
Relationship between Premiums and Returns. Quarterly Journal of Finance and Accounting, 
5-21. 
Dutordoir, M., Roosenboom, P., & Vasconcelos, M. (2014). Synergy Disclosure in Mergers and 
Acquisitions. International Review of Financial Analysis , 88-100. 
Eckbo, B. (2008). Bidding startegies and takeover premiums: A review. Journal of Corporate Finance 
15, 149-178. 
Eckbo, B., & Betton, S. (1999). Toehold, Bid-Jump and Expected Payoffs in Takeovers. Forthcoming, 
Review of Financial Studies. 
Eckbo, B., & Thorburn, K. (2000). Gains to Bidder Firms Revisited: Domestic and Foreign Acquisitions 
in Canada. USA: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 35(01):1-25. 
Eckbo, B., Masulis, R., & Norli, O. (2005). Security Offerings. In B. Eckbo, Handbook of Corporate 
Finance (pp. 233-373). Hanover: Elsevier. 
Eckbo, B., Thorburn, K., & Betton, S. (2009). Merger negotiations and the toehold puzzle. Journal of 
Financial Economics, Volume 91, Issue 2, PAge 158-178. 
Eisfeldt, A., & Rampini, A. (2003). Capital reallocatipon and liquidity. Chicago, USA: Unbulblished 
working paper, Northwestern University. 
Giammarino, R., Heinkel, R., & Eckbo, B. (1990). Asymmetric information and the medium of 
exchange in takeover: Theory and tests. Review of Financial Studies , 651-675. 
Gorbenko, A., & Malenko, A. (2014). Strategic and Financial Bidders in Takeover Auctions. USA: The 
Journal of Finance. 
Gugler, K., Mueller, D., Weichselbaumer, M., & Yurtoglu, B. (2012). Marekt optimism and merger 
waves. Managerial and decision economics, 159-175. 
Harford, J. (2005). What drives merger waves? USA: Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 77, 
Issue 3, page 529-560. 
Hassel, J., & Jennings, R. (1986). Relative Forecast Accuracy and the Timing of Earnings Forecast 
Announcements. The Accounting Review, 58-75. 
53 
 
Heckman, J. (1979). Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error. Econemetrica, 153-161. 
Houston, J., James, C., & Ryngart, M. (2001). Where do merger gains come from? Bank mergers 
from the perspective of insiders and outsider. Journal of Financial Economics, 285-331. 
Ismail, A. (2011). Does the Management's Forecast of Merger Synergies Explain the Premium Paid, 
the. Financial Management, 879-910. 
Jarrel, G., & Poulsen, A. (1989). The Returns to Acquiring Firms in Tender Offers: Evidence from 
Three Decades. Financial Management, 12-19. 
Kitching, J. (1967). Why do mergers miscarry? Harvard Business Review, 84-101. 
La Brusleire, H. (2013). Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information 
that investors do not have. Journal of Banking & Finance, 2106-2123. 
Lemelin, A. (1982). Relatedness in the Patterns of Interindustry Diversification. The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 646-657. 
Levine, O. (2017). Acquiring growth. Journal of Financial Economics, 126(7), 300-319. 
Martin, K. (1996). The method of payment in corporate acquisitions, investement opporunities, and 
mangment ownership. USA: Jorunal of Finance, 51 (4), pp. 1227-1246. 
Mercer, C. (1999). Financial vs. Strategic Buyers. Reprinted from Mercer Capital’s Transaction 
Advisor – Vol. 2, No. 2, 1999. 
Mitchell, M., & Mulherin, J. (1996). The impact of industry shocks on takeover and restructuring 
activity. USA: Journal of Financial Economics, 41 pp.193-229. 
Moeller, S., Schlingemann, F., & Stulz, R. (2004). Firm size and the gains from acquisitions. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 201-228. 
Moeller, S., Schlingemann, F., & Stulz, R. (2007). How Do Diversity of Opinion and Information 
Asymmetry Affect Acquirer Returns? Review of Financial Studies, 2047-2078. 
Mulherin, H., & Simsir, S. (2015). Measuring Deal Premiums in Takeover. Financial Management, 1-
14. 
Myers, S., & Majluf, N. (1984). Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have 
information that investors do not have. USA: Journal of Financial Economics, 13, pp. 187-
221. 
Nagar, V., Nanda, D., & Wysocki, P. (2003). Discretionary Disclosure and Stock-Based Incentives. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 283-309. 
Refinitiv. (2012, May 12). SDC Platinum. Retrieved from Refinitiv: 
https://www.refinitiv.com/en/products/sdc-platinum-financial-
securities/?utm_content=SDC%20Platinum-OTHER-EMEA-G-EN-
BMM&utm_medium=cpc&utm_source=google&utm_campaign=68832_RefinitivBAUPaidSe
arch&elqCampaignId=5917&utm_term=+sdc%20+platinum&gclid=EAIaIQobC 
Rhodes-Kropf, M., & Viswanathan, S. (2005). Market Valuation and Merger Waves. The Journal of 
Finance, Volume 59, Issue 6. 
Roll, R. (1986). The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers. The Journal of Business, 197-216. 
  
 
54  
Schweiger, D., & Very, P. (2003). CREATING VALUE THROUGH MERGER. Elsevier Schience Ltd. - 
Advances in Merger and Acquisitions, Volume 2, page 1-26. 
Servaes, H. (1991). Tobin's Q and the Gains from. The journal of finance, 409-419. 
Shelton, L. (1988). Strategic Business Fits and Corporate Acquisition: Empirical Evidence. Strategic 
management journal, 279-287. 
Sirower, M. (1999). The Synergy Trap: How Companies Lose the Acquisition Game. New York, USA: 
New York, The free press. 
Sirower, M., & Mueller, D. (2003). The Causes of Mergers: Tests Based on the Gains to Acquiring 
Firms' Shareholders and the Size of Premia. Managerial and Decision Economics, 373-391. 
Slusky, A., & Caves, R. (1991). Synergy, Agency, and the Determinants of Premia Paid in Mergers. 
The Journal of Industrial Economics,, 277-296. 
Travlos, N. (1987). Corporate Takeover Bids, Methods of Payment, and Bidding Firm's Stock Returns. 
The Journal of Finance , 943-963. 
Wayne, C., Young, C., & Morris, J. (1997). Financial consequences of employment-change decisions 
in major U.S. corporations. USA: The Academy if Mangment Journal. 
Wooldridge, J. M. (2016). Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach, 6th edition. CENGAGE 
Learning Custom Publishing. 
 
 
 
55 
 
13. Appendix 
 
13.1 Variables and sample creation 
Table 13-1 Steps to final sample13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13  Out of the total sample of 775 deals, Eventus only calculated CAR for 610 deals (CAR sample).  
Filters  # of deals
Date Announced: 1.1.2009 to 31.12.2018; Target and Acquirer Nation: US 92 762
Target and Acquirer Status: Public or Private 52 152
Deal Status: Completed and Unconditional 42 455
Deal Type: Disclosed Value 8 635
Form of the Deal: Acquisition or Merger 3 368
Deals exported to Excel 3 368
Target financial screening: Assets, net sales, EBITDA, Book-value and share price = NOT BLANK 1 098
Acquirer financials screening: Assets  =  NOT BLANK 900
Premium = NOT BLANK 775
Total  sample 775
Deals of total sample with synergy Disclosure 210
Deals of total sample with Acquirer CAR from Eventus 610
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Table 13-2 Variable definitions and sources 
 
Variables Description Source
Dependent variables
Projected synergies
A ratio for projected synergies as part of deal value. The variable 
is calculating by taking the  PV of projected synergies divided by 
Target market value. 
SDC 
Premium
The amount the acquirer pays over market value for the target in 
percent. 
SDC
CAR CAR for the acquirer with a 3-day event window Eventus
Deal characteristics
All cash 
A dummy variable, equal to one if the acquirer pays for the target 
with only  cash.
SDC
All stock 
A dummy variable, equal to one if the acquirer pays for the target 
with only stocks.
SDC 
Same macro industry
A dummy variable, equal to one if the acquirer and the target 
operates in the same macro industry.
SDC
Multiple bidders
A dummy variable, equal to one if it there is more than one bidder 
involved in the auction for the target.
SDC
Year dummies
Dummies for the year of the deal. Two years are merged together 
(example 2009/2010 and 2011/2012). Using 2017/2018 as 
benchmark.
SDC
Disclosed synergy A dummy variable equal to one if the acquirer disclose synergies. 
SDC
Interaction - Disclosed synergy 
and Premium
An interaction variable between the disclosed synergy dummy and 
premium.
SDC
Target characteristics
Industry dummies
Dummies for the different target macro industries. Equal to one if 
the target is in the given macro industry, zero otherwise.
SDC
Price/Book difference
A variable that indicate the difference between the targets P/B and 
the average P/B in the industry the targets operates. 
SDC and Datastream
Operating expenses
A ratio for operating expenses. Operating expenses divided by total 
assets. 
SDC
R&D expenses A ratio for R&D expenses. R&D expenses divided by total assets. 
SDC
Interaction - Operating and         
No Disclosed synergy
An interaction variable between operating ratio and the dummy for 
No Disclosed synergies. 
SDC
Interaction - R&D and                 
No Disclosed synergy
An interaction variable between R&D ratio and the dummy for No 
Disclosed synergies. 
SDC
Relative size
A variable for relative size between the acquirer and the target. The 
variable is calculated as acquirer total assets divided on targets 
total assets. 
SDC
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13.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 13-3 Summary statistics of total sample 
 
 
Table 13-4 Target by macro industry 
 
 
 
 
Mean Median Min Max Standard deviation
Premium 0.36 0.29 -0.16 3.58 0.33
Deal characteristics
All cash offer 0.39 0 0 1 0.49
All stock offer 0.22 0 0 1 0.41
Mixed payment 0.39 0 0 1 0.49
Same macro industry 0.83 1 0 1 0.38
Multiple bidders 0.04 0 0 1 0.19
Target Market Value (in million USD) 2522 494 4.60 60014 6277
Target characteristics
Price/Book difference 0.40 0.75 -95.27 52.63 6.24
Operating ratio 0.66 0.50 -0.11 4.71 0.74
R&D ratio 0.05 0.00 -0.07 0.89 0.11
Relative size 23.74 4.73 0 694.84 60.77
Macro industries
Disclosed 
synergies
Disclosed synergies  
% of total
No disclosed 
synergies
No disclosed synergies 
% of total
Total number of 
deals 
Consumer Products and 
Services
17 63 % 10 37 % 27
Consumer Staples 10 53 % 9 47 % 19
Energy and Power 20 26 % 57 74 % 77
Healthcare 33 34 % 64 66 % 97
High Technology 38 25 % 112 75 % 150
Industrials 21 36 % 37 64 % 58
Materials 15 47 % 17 53 % 32
Media and Entertainment 11 44 % 14 56 % 25
Retail 7 44 % 9 56 % 16
Telecommunications 11 39 % 17 61 % 28
Financials 16 7 % 199 93 % 215
Real Estate 11 35 % 20 65 % 31
Total 210 100 % 565 100 % 775
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13.3 Endogeneity and Heckman correction 
13.3.1 Probit regressions 
Table 13-5 Probit regressions – CAR sample and All transaction sample 
                                  Disclosed synergy Disclosed synergy 
                                    (All transactions sample) (CAR sample) 
 
Operating expenses 0.162** 0.102 
 (0.079) (0.093) 
 
R&D expenses -1.840** -1.212 
 (0.714) (0.747) 
 
Same macro industry -0.139 -0.122 
 (0.139) (0.168) 
 
Relative size -0.008*** -0.030*** 
 (0.002) (0.006) 
 
P/B - Difference -0.012 -0.010 
 (0.009) (0.011) 
 
All cash -0.285** -0.035 
 (0.134) (0.155) 
 
All stocks 0.231 0.146 
 (0.143) (0.165) 
 
Multiple bidders 0.103 0.108 
 (0.262) (0.292) 
 
Energy and Power -0.643*** -0.741*** 
 (0.186) (0.224) 
 
Healthcare 0.029 0.088 
 (0.174) (0.209) 
 
High Technology -0.212 -0.289 
 (0.169) (0.200) 
 
Financial -1.401*** -1.297*** 
 (0.174) (0.199) 
 
2009/2010 0.036 -0.113 
 (0.175) (0.199) 
 
2011/2012 -0.243 0.142 
 (0.205) (0.203) 
 
2013/2014 0.327 -0.512** 
 (0.211) (0.206) 
 
2015/2016 -0.378** 0.084 
 (0.188) (0.172) 
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13.3.2 Heckman corrections – regressions with Inverse Mills ratio 
Table 13-6 Heckman correction on regression with Premium as dependent variable 
 Premium 
Projected synergies 0.026*** 
 (0.009) 
Inverse Mills -0.112 
 (0.393) 
Disclosed synergy -0.073** 
 (0.031) 
P/B - Difference 0.008** 
 (0.004) 
Same macro industry -0.018 
 (0.054) 
Relative size 0.001 
 (0.003) 
All cash 0.082 
 (0.080) 
All stocks -0.069 
 (0.073) 
Multiple bidders 0.142 
 (0.101) 
Operating expenses 0.083 
 (0.061) 
R&D expenses 0.122 
 (0.521) 
Interaction - Operating and No synergy disclosure -0.074 
 (0.053) 
Interaction - R&D and No synergy disclosure 0.748* 
 (0.416) 
Constant 0.356 
 (0.283) 
Year dummies Yes 
Industry dummies Yes 
Observations 775 
Adjusted R2 0.115 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
Constant 0.105 0.213 
 (0.173) (0.239) 
  
Observations 775 610 
Log Likelihood -372.119 -275.050 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 778.238 584.101 
 
Standard errors in parenthesis                                                                           *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 13-7 Heckman correction on regression with CAR as dependent 
variable 
 
 CAR (-1,+1) 
Premium -0.048*** 
 (0.010) 
Inverse Mills 0.004 
 (0.027) 
Disclosed synergy -0.008 
 (0.009) 
Interaction - Disclosed synergy and Premium 0.052*** 
 (0.016) 
P/B - Difference 0.001* 
 (0.001) 
Same macro industry 0.012 
 (0.008) 
Relative size -0.0001 
 (0.001) 
All cash 0.037*** 
 (0.008) 
All stocks 0.004 
 (0.008) 
Multiple bidders 0.030** 
 (0.013) 
Operating expenses 0.004 
 (0.006) 
R&D expenses -0.003 
 (0.041) 
Constant -0.038** 
 (0.017) 
Year dummies Yes 
Industry dummies Yes 
Observations 610 
Adjusted R2 0.126 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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13.4 Sensitivity analysis with different depending variables 
13.4.1 Testing for Annually projection of synergies  
Table 13-8 Regression 1 with Annually Projected synergies as dependent 
variable 
 Annually projected synergies 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Operating expenses 0.090*** 0.093*** 0.104*** 0.105*** 0.099*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) 
R&D expenses 0.537*** 0.489*** 0.506*** 0.466** 0.419*** 
 (0.187) (0.187) (0.186) (0.187) (0.161) 
Same macro industry  0.063** 0.061* 0.057* 0.060* 
  (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
Relative size   -0.0005 -0.001 -0.0005 
   (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
P/B - Difference   0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant 0.011 -0.038 -0.041 -0.021 -0.030 
 (0.025) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.032) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes No No 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Observations 210 210 210 210 210 
Adjusted R2 0.160 0.172 0.184 0.159 0.154 
Standard errors in parenthesis *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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13.4.2 Testing for premium 4 weeks before announcement 
Table 13-9 Regression 2 with Premium 4 weeks before announcement as 
dependent variable 
 Premium 4 weeks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Projected synergies 0.052*** 0.051*** 0.052*** 0.046*** 0.047*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
Disclosed synergy -0.110*** -0.090*** -0.077** -0.057* -0.060* 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.032) 
P/B - Difference  0.001 0.001 0.003 0.004 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Same macro industry  -0.018 -0.015 -0.018 -0.017 
  (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) 
Relative size  0.001** 0.001** 0.001* 0.001* 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
All cash   0.059* 0.057* 0.060* 
   (0.033) (0.031) (0.032) 
All stocks   -0.067** -0.069** -0.066** 
   (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Multiple bidders   0.276** 0.259*** 0.258*** 
   (0.110) (0.088) (0.086) 
Operating expenses    0.017 0.047 
    (0.026) (0.050) 
R&D expenses    0.598 -0.022 
    (0.386) (0.250) 
Interaction - R&D and No Disclosed synergy     0.767* 
     (0.422) 
Interaction - Operating and No Disclosed 
Synergy 
    -0.044 
(0.053) 
Constant 0.345*** 0.336*** 0.304*** 0.275*** 0.273*** 
 (0.024) (0.041) (0.045) (0.054) (0.049) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 775 775 775 775 775 
Adjusted R2 0.114 0.124 0.156 0.174 0.180 
Robust standard errors in paranthesis *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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13.4.3 Testing for different event windows in CAR  
Table 13-10 Regression 3 with CAR (-1,0) as dependent variable 
 CAR (-1,0) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Premium -0.021** -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.025** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Disclosed synergy -0.005 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Interaction - Disclosed synergy  
and Premium 
0.027 
(0.017) 
0.030* 
(0.015) 
0.030* 
(0.015) 
0.025 
(0.016) 
Same macro industry  0.010 0.009 0.012 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
All cash  0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
All stocks  0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Multiple bidders  0.024* 0.024* 0.026** 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
P/B - Difference   0.0001 0.00001 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
Relative size   -0.00000 -0.00001 
   (0.00003) (0.00003) 
Operating expenses    0.007 
    (0.005) 
R&D expenses    -0.036 
    (0.034) 
Constant -0.005 -0.024** -0.024** -0.031*** 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 610 610 610 610 
Adjusted R2 0.054 0.091 0.088 0.094 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 13-11 Regression 3  with CAR (-2,+2) as dependent variable 
 CAR (-2,+2) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Premium -0.034*** -0.042*** -0.044*** -0.046*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Disclosed synergy -0.014 -0.009 -0.010 -0.009 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Interaction - Disclosed synergy and  
Premium 
0.054*** 
(0.017) 
0.057*** 
(0.015) 
0.056*** 
(0.015) 
0.056*** 
(0.016) 
Same macro industry  0.013 0.012 0.013* 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
All cash  0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
All stocks  0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Multiple bidders  0.027** 0.026** 0.027** 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
P/B - Difference   0.001** 0.001** 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
Relative size   0.00000 -0.00000 
   (0.00003) (0.00003) 
Operating expenses    0.004 
    (0.005) 
R&D expenses    0.014 
    (0.034) 
Constant -0.002 -0.029** -0.029** -0.033*** 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 610 610 610 610 
Adjusted R2 0.056 0.101 0.111 0.110 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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13.5 Statistical robustness 
13.5.1 Testing for multicollinearity  
 
 
Table 13-13 Correlation matrix - Disclosed synergy sample 
 
 
Variables Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3
(3)` (4)` (5)` (5)`
Projected synergies 1.41 1.51
Disclosed synergy 1.58 2.68 1.27
Premium 1.64
Ineraction - Disclosed synergy and Premium 2.54
P/B Difference 1.03 1.12 1.13 1.15
Same macro industry 1.06 1.13 1.13 1.14
Relative size 1.18 1.22 1.22 1.26
All cash 1.62 1.63 1.62
All stocks 1.25 1.26 1.26
Multiple bidders 1.03 1.03 1.04
Operating expenses 1.26 1.47 4.13 1.48
R&D expenses 1.43 1.61 6.76 1.73
Interaction - Operating and No Disclosed Synergy 4.90
Interaction - R&D and No Disclosed synergy 6.64
Average VIF 1.19 1.34 2.83 1.47
Correlation
R&D 
expenses
Operating 
expenses
P/B Diff Relative Size
Same Macro 
Industry
R&D expenses 1
Operating expenses 0.172 1
P/B Diff -0.039 0.016 1
Relative Size 0.024 -0.054 0.145 1
Same Macro Industry 0.063 -0.115 -0.067 0.017 1
Table 13-12 VIF - test for Multicollinearity 
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Table 13-14 Correlation matrix - Whole sample 
 
Table 13-15 Correlation matrix - CAR sample 
 
13.5.2 Testing for heteroscedasticity 
 
Correlation Synergies 
R&D 
expenses
Operating 
expenses
P/B Diff
Relative 
Size
Same 
Macro 
All Cash All Stocks
Multiple 
Bidders
Synergies 1
R&D expenses -0.022 1
Operating expenses 0.022 0.234 1
P/B Diff 0.032 -0.282 -0.076 1
Relative Size -0.065 0.152 0.247 -0.118 1
Same Macro Industry 0.015 -0.023 -0.227 0.001 -0.104 1
All Cash 0.016 0.236 0.319 -0.061 0.344 -0.167 1
All Stocks 0.041 -0.131 -0.174 0.052 -0.161 0.115 -0.421 1
Multiple Bidders -0.018 0.081 -0.009 -0.003 -0.026 0.017 0.024 -0.055 1
Correlation Premium
Synergy 
Disclosure
Same 
Macro 
Industry
All Cash All Stock
Multiple 
Bidders
P/B Diff
Relative 
Size
Premium 1
Synergy Disclosure -0.055 1
Same Macro Industry -0.069 -0.062 1
All Cash 0.178 -0.054 -0.182 1
All Stock -0.124 0.033 0.113 -0.424 1
Multiple Bidders 0.104 0.024 0.009 0.023 -0.048 1
P/B Diff 0.077 0.015 0.007 -0.064 0.046 -0.001 1
Relative Size -0.018 -0.073 -0.021 0.150 -0.072 -0.160 -0.066 1
Breusch-Pagan test for Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3
Heteroscedasticity (3)` (5)` (4)`
14.579 98.103 50.748
P-value 0.3344 0.00000 0.0001
Table 13-16 Breausch-Pagan test for Heteroscedasticity 
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13.6 Regressions displayed with inclusion of year and 
industry dummies  
Table 13-17 Regression 1  - All variables included 
 Projected synergies 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Operating expenses 0.786*** 0.810*** 0.903*** 0.910*** 0.824*** 
 (0.177) (0.176) (0.189) (0.190) (0.188) 
R&D expenses 3.963** 3.478* 3.652** 3.331* 2.604* 
 (1.799) (1.799) (1.787) (1.801) (1.554) 
Same macro industry  0.637** 0.609** 0.580* 0.644** 
  (0.306) (0.305) (0.307) (0.306) 
Relative size   -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 
   (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
P/B - Difference   0.044* 0.045* 0.042* 
   (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Energy and Power -0.508 -0.554 -0.595 -0.540  
 (0.462) (0.459) (0.456) (0.451)  
Healthcare -0.604 -0.605 -0.602 -0.556  
 (0.378) (0.375) (0.372) (0.376)  
High Technology -0.388 -0.293 -0.343 -0.226  
 (0.405) (0.404) (0.402) (0.406)  
Financials 0.973* 0.864* 0.929* 0.913*  
 (0.503) (0.501) (0.498) (0.505)  
2009/2010 1.125*** 1.144*** 1.133***   
 (0.412) (0.409) (0.406)   
2011/2012 -0.400 -0.348 -0.382   
 (0.508) (0.505) (0.501)   
2013/2014 0.033 0.017 0.019   
 (0.533) (0.529) (0.525)   
2015/2016 0.290 0.269 0.229   
 (0.487) (0.483) (0.480)   
Constant 0.443* -0.057 -0.078 0.089 0.023 
 (0.246) (0.342) (0.341) (0.333) (0.313) 
Observations 210 210 210 210 210 
R2 0.168 0.185 0.206 0.167 0.134 
Adjusted R2 0.126 0.140 0.153 0.130 0.113 
Residual Std. Error 1.842 (df = 199) 1.827 (df = 198) 1.813 (df = 196) 1.838 (df = 200) 1.855 (df = 204) 
F Statistic 4.004*** (df = 10; 199) 4.096*** (df = 11; 198) 
3.907*** (df = 13; 
196) 
4.470*** (df = 9; 200) 6.333*** (df = 5; 204) 
Standard errors in parenthesis *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table 13-18 Regression 2 -  All variables included 
 
 Premium 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Projected synergies 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
Disclosed synergy -0.100*** -0.085*** -0.072** -0.051* -0.075** 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.032) 
P/B - Difference  0.004*** 0.004** 0.006*** 0.007*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Same macro industry  -0.037 -0.033 -0.030 -0.029 
  (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) 
Relative size  0.001* 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
All cash   0.062* 0.057* 0.061* 
   (0.033) (0.031) (0.032) 
All stocks   -0.053** -0.054** -0.050* 
   (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Multiple bidders   0.165 0.153* 0.150* 
   (0.110) (0.088) (0.086) 
Operating expenses    0.045* 0.095* 
    (0.026) (0.050) 
R&D expenses    0.565 -0.026 
    (0.386) (0.250) 
Interaction - R&D and  
No Disclosed synergy 
    0.741
* 
(0.422) 
Interaction - Operating and  
No Disclosed Synergy 
    -0.073 
(0.053) 
 
Energy and Power -0.064 -0.053 -0.024 0.001 -0.002 
 (0.049) (0.048) (0.051) (0.054) (0.051) 
Healthcare -0.006 -0.007 -0.018 -0.083 -0.080 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.054) (0.051) 
High Technology 0.107** 0.113** 0.095* 0.049 0.044 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.049) (0.040) (0.040) 
Financials -0.044 -0.025 0.015 0.061 0.055 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.029) (0.038) (0.035) 
 
2009/2010 0.082** 0.080** 0.084** 0.084** 0.083** 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) 
2011/2012 0.060 0.052 0.042 0.050 0.048 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) 
2013/2014 0.018 0.011 0.015 0.013 0.011 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.041) 
2015/2016 0.052 0.045 0.035 0.031 0.032 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
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Constant 0.347*** 0.357*** 0.326*** 0.271*** 0.277*** 
 (0.024) (0.041) (0.045) (0.054) (0.049) 
Observations 775 775 775 775 775 
R2 0.062 0.077 0.099 0.128 0.139 
Adjusted R2 0.050 0.061 0.080 0.108 0.116 
Residual Std. Error 0.322 (df = 764) 0.320 (df = 761) 0.317 (df = 758) 0.312 (df = 756) 0.311 (df = 754) 
F Statistic 5.033*** (df = 10; 764) 4.888*** (df = 13; 761) 5.207*** (df = 16; 758) 6.189*** (df = 18; 756) 6.090*** (df = 20; 754) 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis                                                                                                *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Table 13-19 Regression Hypothesis 3 - All variables included 
 CAR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Premium -0.037*** -0.045*** -0.047*** -0.048*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Disclosed synergy -0.013 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Interaction - Disclosed synergy  
and Premium 
0.050*** 
(0.017) 
0.054*** 
(0.015) 
0.053*** 
(0.015) 
0.052*** 
(0.016) 
Same macro industry  0.012 0.012 0.013* 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
All cash  0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
All stocks  0.004 0.004 0.004 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Multiple bidders  0.029** 0.029** 0.030** 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
P/B - Difference   0.001** 0.001** 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
Relative size   0.00001 0.00000 
   (0.00003) (0.00003) 
Operating expenses    0.003 
    (0.005) 
R&D expenses    0.001 
    (0.034) 
Energy and Power -0.043*** -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.034*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
Healthcare 0.001 -0.008 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
High Technology 0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
Financials -0.014** -0.001 -0.002 0.001 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
2009/2010 0.014 0.015* 0.014 0.015 
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 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
2011/2012 0.022** 0.021** 0.020** 0.019** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
2013/2014 0.035*** 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
2015/2016 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Constant -0.004 -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.035*** 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Observations 610 610 610 610 
R2 0.084 0.139 0.154 0.155 
Adjusted R2 0.067 0.118 0.129 0.127 
Residual Std. Error 0.068 (df = 598) 0.066 (df = 594) 0.065 (df = 592) 0.065 (df = 590) 
F Statistic 4.981*** (df = 11; 598) 6.410*** (df = 15; 594) 6.326*** (df = 17; 592) 5.675*** (df = 19; 590) 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
 
